The following message is a courtesy copy of an article that has been posted to bit.listserv.ibm-main,alt.folklore.computers as well.
Peter Flass <[email protected]> writes: > I'd say I'm sure IBM knows what they're doing, but based on what I've > heard about how the company makes decisions, I doubt it. > > It seems to me that IBM has a lot to gain and not much to lose by > encouraging companies to support z/OS on smaller boxes. It's a market > they don't sell to, so there are probably very few lost sales. > Letting developers have cheaper systems can only encourage developers. > Last but not least, letting small customers "buy into" mainframes > cheaply will probably encourage them to stick with IBM as they grow. > > Probably some suit in mainframe marketing is afraid he might lose one > or two sales, and he's not looking at what's good for all of IBM in > the long term. re: http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2009o.html#29 Justice Department probing allegations of abuse by IBM in mainframe computer market but some of it goes back to the earlier litigation days and clone processors. somewhat as result of previous litigation, there was the 23jun69 unbundling announcement with starting to charge for software and services; however the justification was made that kernel software would still be free. http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#unbundle recent posts with references to Future System effort: http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2009o.html#4 Broken Brancher http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2009o.html#10 Microprocessors with Definable MIcrocode http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2009o.html#11 Microprocessors with Definable MIcrocode http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2009o.html#12 Calling ::routines in oorexx 4.0 http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2009o.html#14 Microprocessors with Definable MIcrocode this reference talks about major motivation for FS being clone controllers. http://www.ecole.org/Crisis_and_change_1995_1.htm from above: IBM tried to react by launching a major project called the 'Future System' (FS) in the early 1970's. The idea was to get so far ahead that the competition would never be able to keep up, and to have such a high level of integration that it would be impossible for competitors to follow a compatible niche strategy. However, the project failed because the objectives were too ambitious for the available technology. Many of the ideas that were developed were nevertheless adapted for later generations. Once IBM had acknowledged this failure, it launched its 'box strategy', which called for competitiveness with all the different types of compatible sub-systems. But this proved to be difficult because of IBM's cost structure and its R&D spending, and the strategy only resulted in a partial narrowing of the price gap between IBM and its rivals. ... snip ... this reference (from Morris & Fergus book) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#33 IBM's "VM for the PC" c.1984?? makes references to the distraction of FS (which was going to completely replace 360/370) and allowing 370 hardware & software product pipeline to go dry ... contributed significantly to allowing clone processors to gain foothold in the market place (also that the damage of FS failure resulted in the old culture under Watsons being replaced with sycophancy and "make no waves" under Opel and Akers). http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#futuresys With the rise of clone processors, there was change in decision to not charge for kernel software ... and my (about to be released) resource manager was selected for guinea pig ... i got to spend 6 months off & on with business planning people & lawyers working on policies for kernel software charging (this was made more complex during the couple years of transition when there were parts of kernel that were free and parts that weren't free and possibly complex dependency between free and not free kernel software). Besides the change to charging for kernel software (because of rise of clone processors), the later OCO (object code only) decision was possibly another outcome. As to clone controllers ... back as undergraduate in the 60s ... I had to add ascii/tty terminal support to cp67. I tried to do it in such a way that it extended the "automatic terminal recognition" already in place for 2741 & 1052. It turned out that I tried to make the 2702 controller do something that it couldn't quite do. This was part of the motivation for the univ. to launch a clone controller project ... reverse engineer the channel interface, build channel interface board for Interdata/3 and program the Interdata/3 to emulate 2702. There was later article blaming four of us for clone controller business. http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#360pcm Perkin-Elmer acquired Interdata and the box was sold during much of the 70s & 80s under the Perkin-Elmer name. Even in the later 90s, I ran into the boxes at major financial transaction processor datacenter (that was handling large percentage of the merchant POS card swipe terminals in the US). as to "synchophancy and make no waves" ... recent post about bringing down the wrath of the MVS organization http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2009o.html#17 Broken hardware was Re: Broken Brancher when I first got phone call from POK ... I thot it might be about helping fix the software to handle all the error scenarios (that was resulting in MVS system failures) ... but it turned out to be about who was my management and what made me think I had any right to mention MVS problems. -- 40+yrs virtualization experience (since Jan68), online at home since Mar1970 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: GET IBM-MAIN INFO Search the archives at http://bama.ua.edu/archives/ibm-main.html
