john_matt...@ea.epson.com (John Mattson) writes:
> Back to basics: My pet peeve(s) (serious security concerns) are: 
> 1) sites which do not allow use of the full set of special characters.  My 
> banks, Google and Facebook do, so it is not that hard.  The more 
> posibilities  for each character, the more secure the password. 
> 2) sites which limit length of userid and/or password.  That's just plain 
> dumb. 

re:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2012j.html#47 Yahoo Password Breach: 7 Lessons 
Learned - Security - Attacks/breaches - Informationweek
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2012j.html#53 Yahoo Password Breach: 7 Lessons 
Learned - Security - Attacks/breaches - Informationweek

somebody in POK sent me a copy of Corporate Directive on Passwords late
Friday and I redistributed. Over the weekend, somebody printed on 6670
(ibm copier3 with computer interface) on corporate letterhead paper on
placed it in all the building corporate bulletin boards. Monday morning
numerous people were caught ... even tho the date is clearly sunday and
no "real" corporate directives are dated sunday. Corporate password
rules from long ago and far away 
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#52 OT Re: A beautiful morning in AFM.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#53 April Fools Day

static, shared secrets were somewhat acceptable for authentication 40yrs
ago when a person only had a few. corporate rules were put in place to
create impossible to guess (therefor impossible to remember) shared
secrets for authentication (with frequent changes) ... as if it was the
only authentication the person has to deal with. 

With the proliferation of static, shared secrets paradigm as
authentication mechanism (pins, passwords, etc) ... it isn't uncommon
for an individual to have large scores or hundreds (of impossible to
remember values). Furthermore, "safe" security practices require a
unique shared secret for every unique security domain (as countermeasure
to cross-domain attacks). misc. past posts discussing static
shared-secret authentication
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#secrets

misc. past posts discussing internet/network based authentication
using non-static data (countermeasure to harvesting and reply attacks)
for kerberos
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#kerberos

similar discussions for radius
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#radius

... aka simple registration of public key in lieu of password ... w/o
the enormous complexity and points of failure introduced by digital
certificates and PKIs ... misc. past posts discussing non-certificate
based public key authentication
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#certless

-- 
virtualization experience starting Jan1968, online at home since Mar1970

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