On Friday, 09/17/2010 at 01:50 EDT, Michel Beaulieu 
<beaulieumic...@live.ca> wrote:
> We are not using an External Security Manager(no ESM).
>  
> I am trying to see if it is possible to do the following: 
>  
>  
> 1. Logon to CMS with userid'A' 
> 2. (Get userid'B' and password through some authorized method)
> 3. using the telnet command (in transparent mode) and automatically 
login to 
> userid'B'.
> 4. (do some work with userid'B' interacting with the physical person) 
> 5. logoff userid'B' and return control to userid'A'
>  
> I could probably achieve what I want by programming using Logical Device 
and 
> doing the logon in my code.
> Then I have to manage all the 3270 conversation from beginning to end.
>  
> I am just wandering if such a solution already exists. 
>  
> I would hate to re-invent something like that.

You've gotten lots of ideas from people about SVMs that can do work on 
your behalf.  But what you *won't* get with that paradigm is the concept 
that you are acting as "User B".  SVMs are privileged and they can be 
programmed to do different things for different people, but it is always a 
client-server model.  You make a request, it acts with it's own 
privileges.  At no time does the SVM actually *become* User B so that the 
system will enforce User B's privileges on the the SVM.  As others have 
said, this is a direct result of the fact that virtual machines are 
separate servers, not processes within a single server.

When tied into a real programming interface rather than a MSG/SMSG model, 
you can even get a reasonable facsimile of an interactive command session. 
 E.g. DOAS user2 this_command.  The SVM can see if you are authorized to 
act as user2 and whether or not user2 has access to this_command.  The 
more sophisticated the SVM, the more automated such things can be, and 
they can even integrate with ESMs.

Beware of step 2.  It will attract auditors like moths to a flame.  Any 
ability to extract another user's password is simply going to highlight 
that you are storing passwords in clear-text, which a violation of most 
modern password security standards.  (Hence the need for an ESM.)

Alan Altmark

z/VM and Linux on System z Consultant
IBM System Lab Services and Training 
ibm.com/systems/services/labservices 
office: 607.429.3323
alan_altm...@us.ibm.com
IBM Endicott

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