On 12/9/22 10:36 AM, Michael Thomas wrote:
One of the original goals was that the sending domain could theoretically take responsibility for sending the mail. It was never defined what that might entail but since a protocol was never envisioned for this to happen in transit, it was tacitly assumed that it was some out of band mechanism, like oh say, sending mail to abuse@ or something like that. They could then see that it was really from them and take action on the user who sent it. That's especially true when submission became the norm.If the signature was stripped out of the mail, it gives an easy out for the sending domain to disclaim its involvement. That defeats the entire utility of taking responsibility. That's a problem, and we shouldn't be stripping out perfectly valid functionality.
This seems very reminiscent of the non-repudiation that S/MIME / PGP signatures provide. With the difference being that S/MIME / PGP signatures operate with user granularity, while DKIM operates with host (or domain if keys are shared among hosts) granularity.
Is that an accurate take away from your statements Mike? -- Grant. . . . unix || die
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
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