Sorry for the delayed response. I looked for currently available OpenSSL signature algorithms and don't see composite PQC. I do see support for ML-DSA algorithm in OpenSSL 3.6.4: ML-DSA-44, MLDSA44 ML-DSA-65, MLDSA65 ML-DSA-87, MLDSA87
I checked with Viktor Dukhovni at Openssl, it sounds like it will not be supported in the near term. Another way to build out support for composite PQC signatures is to use the multi-algorithm signature support in DKIM2. I think some folks suggested that early on. Regarding RSA vs Ed25519, sure, if we use DKIM2 multi-signature support, supporting it should also be straightforward. -Wei On Mon, Oct 5, 2026 at 10:08 AM John R Levine <[email protected]> wrote: > On Mon, 5 Oct 2026, Wei Chuang wrote: > > Just following up here. At the DKIM interim -05, PQC was discussed; the > > direction is to use a composite aka hybrid: ML-DSA-44 / Ed25519 to > support > > PQC. This would apply only to DKIM2, skipping DKIM1. The belief is that > > the update could be done as small text additions to existing drafts > rather > > than requiring a new internet-draft. Assuming that, we'll need new text > > for the draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec and draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns. > > We heard that while that combo is the best guess at the moment for a PQ > algorithm, it may not be in the future. So what's important is that we > have at least two algorithms specified so we can test out key and > algorithm rotation. > > That reminds me, are we including RSA keys? The argument against was that > ed25519 keys are better in every way, argument for was that there are a > lot of published RSA keys people might want to keep using. > > Regards, > John Levine, [email protected], Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY > Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly >
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