Hi!
On 10/14/26 16:20, Bron Gondwana wrote:
On Wed, Oct 14, 2026, at 10:04, Hannah Stern wrote:
Then in transition, I could add ED25519 (or some PQ/hybrid). A verifier
that hasn't yet implemented PQ works with the RSA entry. A verifier that
already supports both requires both to validate.
Later when I expect most verifiers to be updated, I could sign ED25519
or PQ/hybrid only.
We want to avoid the current situation which is, briefly.
1. RSA works everywhere
2. ED25519 is buggy at some sites
3. therfore -- everyone keeps using RSA
There are real downsites to using ED25519 - some verifiiers are buggy,
some generators are buggy, interop is broken. What we don't want is
someone to deploy a bad generator, or a bad receiver for ed25519 and
suddenly their mail stops flowing despite still having a perfectly
good RSA signature on it. Because then people will be afraid to upgrade.
I'm not sure if fail-very-slowly (updating the spec towards an OR rule,
i.e. as long as any s= entry validates, that's a definite PASS) is the
best approach for getting that fixed.
That will provide an incentive to _at most_ parallel-sign RSA + ED25519,
and as long as the mail gets through, we're content. Even if some
receivers might have lots of "this is PASS but the ED25519 entry failed"
lines in logs, there would probably be not much incentive to read and
act on them. If the issue is on the sender's side, they'd probably not
even get feedback about their bug.
I'm not sure what a good fix is. In an ideal world, fail-fast would be
incentive to fix things. But that breaks down as long as there's a
working fallback (RSA only), as you say.
If there are many divergent implementations of DKIM/DKIM2
ed25519-sha256, this might point to a need towards
- Yet clearer specification
- Test vectors (In DKIM2 that would be sample keys, sample M-I/D2-S
lines and resulting signatures - which are IIRC determinstic with ed25519).
- Perhaps a reference implementation (perhaps _only_ if the specific
signing/verification step, i.e. input would be the M-I + D2-S lines +
private key, output a signature; or M-I + D2S lines (with signature) +
public key -> verification result) which would need to be _well_
reviewed and match test vectors.
And perhaps in interop testing (which we hope to join once our first
version is fully ready to be integrated), we could possibly try to start
early with ed25519-only at least for some specific test traffic (!= real
user/customer traffic).
Hannah.
--
Hannah Stern
Software Developer
Mail Transfer Development
1&1 Mail & Media Development & Technology GmbH | | |
Phone: +49 721 91374-4519
E-Mail:[email protected] | Web:www.mail-and-media.com www.gmx.net www.web.de www.mail.com www.united-internet-media.de
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Geschäftsführer: Alexander Charles, Dr. Michael Hagenau, Thomas Ludwig, Dr.
Verena Patzelt
Member of United Internet
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