Hmmm. 1. Abstract and 1. Intro cite data integrity. Does there need to be more detail explaining that cryptographic authentication provides data integrity too?
1. 1.1 Scope lists things DKIM does not deal with, including a replay attack. Does the text really need more discussion than that? Here's core question with this sort of overview: It can include too much tutorial about basic technology, rather than focusing on the specifics of the technology it is meant to describe. Some pedagogy is needed, but how much? d/ J D Falk wrote: > Suggested addition to section 2, though I'm not entirely certain that > "validity" is the correct word to use here: > > 2.3. Establishing Message Validity > > Though man-in-the-middle attacks are historically rare in email, > it is nevertheless theoretically possible for a message to be > modified during transit. An interesting side effect of the > cryptographic method used by DKIM is that it is possible to be > certain that a signed message (or, if l= is used, the signed > portion of a message) has not been modified. If it has been > changed in any way, then the message will not be verified > successfully with DKIM. > > As described above, this validity neither lowers nor raises the > level of trust associated with the message. If it was an > untrustworthy message when initially sent, the verifier may be > certain that the message will be equally untrustworthy upon > receipt and successful verification. > > -- > J.D. Falk > Receiver Products > Return Path > > _______________________________________________ > NOTE WELL: This list operates according to > http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html > -- Dave Crocker Brandenburg InternetWorking bbiw.net _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
