On 19/May/11 05:17, John Levine wrote: > The point I was making was that ever more complex ways to decide that > two mutated versions of a message are "the same" aren't likely to help > much, certainly not compared to the large cost of implementing code > even more complex than what relaxed does now.
Just to mention two of those ways, MIME rewriting is a capability mayor MTAs introduced when MIME took root, HTML styles mangling is an ongoing MUA exercise. > And anyway, if your goal is for your message to survive, you should > armor it better, not come up with more arcane ways to declare that > it may be bleeding heavily but it's not dead yet. Interesting, but not less intricate. The semantics of authenticating only the armored part of a message is not obvious. Resorting to base64 encoding is subject to varying interpretations, including spammers attempts to avoid naive content filtering. _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
