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>>>>> "Zefram" == Zefram <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Zefram> Last week I published an I-D, draft-main-sane-tld-00, which
Zefram> argued that there is a need in various Internet protocols for
I'll read your draft, which I have not yet done.
Zefram> The debate in dnsop actually centred on whether this is an IETF
Zefram> matter at all, rather than on which WG it is relevant to. Some
Zefram> said that it's not a technical problem -- it's true that it's not
Zefram> a technical problem in the DNS protocol, it's a problem for other
Zefram> protocols. There were varying opinions on the extent to which
Zefram> ICANN is, or should be, involved.
I would generally agree that the issues are mostly political.
There are various dynamic DNS systems out there, many are now switching
to DNS update protocol from the various UDP based hacks that were out there.
The opportunistic encryption draft
(draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic-02.txt)
relies on ability of users' to populate the reverse DNS maps (and
then to secure it with DNSSEC). The major obstucle is the "IPtelcos"/CableCos
who aren't being very retinscent to actually let people being peers rather
than just client-consumers. There is, with dynamic DNS update no reason why
they should not permit people with "always-on" IPs to populate the reverse
DNS.
] ON HUMILITY: to err is human. To moo, bovine. | firewalls [
] Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works, Ottawa, ON |net architect[
] [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ |device driver[
] panic("Just another NetBSD/notebook using, kernel hacking, security guy"); [
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