Hi Phillip,
I am personally not worried that the standardization work in the IETF
can be sabotaged by governments since our process is open, and
transparent to everyone who cares to see what is going on. I could,
however, see easily how that is a problem with some other organizations
(without listing any).
I believe it is useful to talk about specific cases instead of abstract
concerns to see whether there is a problem at all in the IETF. Maybe
that would allow us to find out whether there is a room for improvement.
Ciao
Hannes
PS: From my work in the IETF I am more worried about security & privacy
unfriendly ideas individuals and companies come up with. Those obviously
help the NSA and others to intercept communication more easily.
On 19.09.2013 18:37, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
One of the biggest problems resulting from the Snowden/PRISM fiasco is
that we now know that the NSA has been spending a significant sum (part
but not all of a $250 million budget) on infiltrating and manipulating
the standards process.
As one of my friends in the civil rights movement from the 60s told me,
the worst thing that we could do now is to have a witch hunt looking for
the informers. Not least because it is not just the NSA that we should
worry about. There are many other governments attempting to influence
decisions in standards process for their own ends.
For what it is worth, I think the mode of influence is likely indirect.
If anyone has seen the movie Breaking Glass, there is the scene where
the record company A&R man tells the manager to stand firm against the
band member's demand for a new rig that he tells the band that their
sound desperately needs.
The issue is not limited to pure security issues either. The biggest
diplomatic storms over the Internet come from the perception that the US
is controlling IP address space and BGP AS numbers. The risk for a
foreign government is that the US could abuse its influence over the
institutions it has created to manage these resources for economic
leverage at some point.
The issue we need to focus on is how to convince our audience that our
specifications have not been compromised by government influence.
Whatever our personal political views on the matter are, the views of
our audience are likely to be different. Most of our audience are not US
citizens, they are not even from the Anglosphere.
Ever since I left MIT to help start VeriSign I have been on notice that
every proposal I make is immediately suspect as it might be an attempt
to bind the Internet to the power of the one CA. That is OK, I don't
complaint about that, I have always understood that anyone who is taking
on a position of extreme responsibility is subject to an equally extreme
degree of proof.
The point I am making here is everyone else needs to think in the same
manner.
One bad habit I think that should stop is trimming requirements before
starting design. If a legitimate use case raises a legitimate
requirement, that requirement should appear in the final requirements
document produced whether it is addressed in the final design or not.
The process I have seen instead is that people argue about whether a
requirement should be included in the requirements document and the
final requirements document is a list of requirements the noisiest
people in the group thought were important rather than what the document
should be which is a tool to determine whether the design is capable of
addressing the use cases.
And yes, I am raising this because I suspect that manipulating
requirements is one of the chief ways that undue and corrupt influence
is applied.
--
Website: http://hallambaker.com/
