---------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe?, send your mail to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] with body mail: "signoff indonews" need more help?, send your mail to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] with body mail: "info refcard" ---------------------------------------------------------- Reflection on Indonesia s East Timor Move. By: D. Soares (Ideas and arguments presented in this piece of thought are entirely the responsibility of the author and do not represent the ideas of any institution or individual related to the issue of ET). Indonesia shocked the world last week when the country s cabinet decided to change its 23 years policy on East Timor. It agreed to make independence for the territory possible if the East Timorese reject the offer of a wide ranging autonomy . For the UN, Indonesia s decision to let East Timor go seemed to go beyond the line of current Tripartite talks on wide ranging autonomy . Not surprisingly, Kofi Annan responded immediately that talks on autonomy must go on. In East Timor, Jakarta s statement was received with mix feelings though it must be acknowledged that to most East Timorese the move was a water-spring in the middle of a desert . Many even went further to praise Habibie s government for this courageous move. Regardless of such reactions, there are a few questions that one may ask. Why did the Habibie government decide to let East Timor go ? Are the East Timorese prepared for a self-rule government? Ali Alatas acknowledged that international advice , especially from Australian government and the US senate, was the main force behind Jakarta s move (See Kompas, 28/1/99). While not undermining Alatas confession, it is clear to us that several internal issues both politically and economically contributed a great deal to Indonesia s move. Political reasons 1. The fearful issue of Balcanasasion should East Timor breakaway from Indonesia is no longer a serious threat to Indonesia as a whole. 2. Nevertheless, should East Timor be relinquished from Indonesia, this has to be done in a delicate way to block increasingly separatist s activities in other provinces such as Aceh and West Papua. 3. The recent conflicts in Indonesia masquerading in religious differences might provoke further ethnic tension between those of the outer islands and the majority of the Javanese. Furthermore, the current economic turmoil may spur other political differences to emerge within this already heterogeneous society. The action of letting East Timor go , is best for any Indonesian government, for if the issue has been solved once and for all, Jakarta can concentrate entirely on its internal problems. 4. The eagerness of prominent GOLKAR members to distance themselves from Suharto and his past records which may jeopardise the party in the coming election should it maintain the old policies. 5. Mounting pressure on the government by reformists and intellectuals such as Amin Rais (PAN), Sri Bintand Pamungkas (PUDI), Mochtar Pakpahan (SBSI) and other open minded Indonesians about relinquishing East Timor also contribute to Jakarta s move. 6. It is unlikely for GOLKAR or the current government to win the next election and since other potential parties such as PAN, PKB and PUDI have stated that they will change the status of East Timor if they come to power, GOLKAR surely does not want to be anticipated or left behind. 7. Indonesia s supposedly successful diplomacy has suffered serious setbacks during years of diplomatic campaign especially with regard to East Timor. Whereas coordination and cooperation with high level military in Jakarta may be done easily, inconsistency between diplomacy and field-operation is often the case. As such, diplomacy cannot afford to engage with continuous criticism on Indonesia s human rights record in the territory. This has been going on for 23 years. 8. There are other personal interests among individuals within the current government that need to be taken into account. President Habibie does not want to be seen as another protigi of Suharto and, as he often referred to, expect to end his presidential-term happily. Mr. Ali Alatas, of course, still expects to pursue his long-term goal, becoming the UN-SG and to achieve this goal, the pebble in his shoes must be pulled out. Mr. Yunus Yosfiah also expects to clear up the rumour surrounding his involvement in the killing of Western journalists in Balibo in 1975. Mr. Muladi, the current Justice Minister, is a high profile lawyer and intellectual and a former member of the National Commission of Human Rights, who, according to some sources, does not want to be blamed for past political wrongdoing. He even deserves credit for his reformasi ideas, which may have contributed to the surprised move on East Timor. Economic reasons 1. Indonesia is said to gain nothing from the province even if East Timor continues to remain part of the country. Furthermore, growing economic uncertainty is the main problem the country has to deal with, not East Timor. 2. Currently, according to Jakarta, East Timor s generates only 7% of the total spending in a year. The rest of this yearly spending is said to derive entirely from Jakarta. (To the extent that this argument can be used to argue that East Timor is not economically viable to be independent still open to discussion. However, one should be reminded that the first self-rule government in the territory will have to cope with economic hardship in its first years in office). 3. Keeping East Timor as an integral part of Indonesia meaning that additional military spending has to be on the agenda. Indonesia is simply too weak for the time being. While it might be willing to do so for the sake of the military, aid donors continue to insist on substantial cut in military spending. In addition, arm sales from other countries always attach East Timor as a stringent condition, i. e., not to be used there. 4. The sound oil abundance in Timor Sea, which might contribute millions of dollars to Jakarta, seems to have little to heal, or even exacerbate, the current crisis. Indeed, the current crisis has put Indonesia s credibility at stake. It does not only disturb the ongoing oil exploration in the area but causing investors credibility on Jakarta to fade away. The recent sneaking in of Australia s BHP s director into Cipinang prison to beg assurances from Xanana Gusmao is a good example of this declining credibility on Jakarta. 5. Keeping East Timor for another five or ten years is a serious mistake for Indonesia whereas, Jakarta knows very well that the result of a referendum will not necessarily put the country in an advantageous position. Combining all these economic and political issues into account, finding a political solution to the question of East Timor is better than keeping it as an endless burden. As Alatas stated in his shocking press conference that there is no way for us to accept a transitional autonomy if in the end (in a referendum) they say goodbye and thank you . The question is now left to the East Timorese to decide. However, are they ready to accept this cargo ? Experts and street people alike have forwarded questions about political and economic viability. Most of them argue with pessimism, though the same people reserve a certain degree of hope about the future of an independent East Timor. Prof. Arif Budiman, an Indonesian prominent academician at Melbourne University argued that they (the East Timorese) won t be rich and that they might have to work hard, but they could do it (Reuters, 28 January 1999). While the writer agrees that there are some economic difficulties in the early years of its independence, the future is without optimism. I am not in a position to explain such economic potentialities , for a separate paper is needed to cover such issues. But suffice it to say that its abundant and marketable natural resources (not to count oil and gas); its agriculture, fishery and livestock potency; its tourism spots and its rich cultural heritage will not allow any room for starvation. One thing to remember, a future East Timor government, politicians, academics and the people will have to be precise on their measures and decisions about what lies ahead. Various economic theories ranging from Adam Smith and Ricardo back in the 17th century down to the current Neo Marxist approach (market-oriented) are not necessarily applicable if internal political friction, vengeance, hatred and suspicion remain. Should attempts to foster stability fail, progress and efforts to improve the economy of the Timorese is still along way to go. This argument is not given without reasons: 1. The contradiction between those for and against integration inherited from the period of integration needs to be waved away. The 1998 Dare Communiqui may provide ground for reconciliation but given its fragile nature, fight between the two groups may revive at any time in the future, let alone Indonesia s involvement in supporting one side. 2. Within the resistance, classic contradiction among the old political parties remains. Although these parties have vowed to accept CNRT as their main umbrella organisation, it is not surprising that old injuries may be scratched up again. This has yet to include differences within each of these political parties. 3. The inherited militancy among the youths who have resisted Indonesian military in towns and villages for the last 10 years have to be dealt with a careful, systematic and comprehensive approach. These youths can be the source of political chaos at anytime and instability. 4. The emergence of several, correct me if I am mistaken, racism-oriented groups may spur renewed conflicts within the society. As it is understood that racist-oriented organisations have upsurge following discontentment among some sections within the resistance. A precise approach is needed to prevent unexpected incident. 5. Among the pro integration/autonomy groups , we have witnessed divergence of views, especially, on Habibie s proposal about a wide range autonomy for the territory. One group wants to maintain the status quo while the another group supports a fair and democratic referendum. This has yet to mention the latest physical battle between the two over the dismissal of a local governor. They cannot just be ignored, for in a supposedly democratic East Timor, the presence of each of them is seemingly important in the political scene as the one in power. 6. The interest of a small-group of people adamant with the status quo, who in any circumstances may draw sections within Indonesia to provoke instability in East Timor, has to be accommodated by the first self-rule government if it is to prevent further political friction. To sum up these points, it is clear that internal economic pressure did play a significant role in Indonesia s recent move in uplifting East Timor political status (See Ginanjar Kartasasmita, Indo. Finance Minister s statement in Reuters). The monetary crisis currently facing Indonesia is the major case, for without the recent crisis, such a move would have been unpredictable. This does not necessarily imply that the transfer of power, if Indonesian remains committed to its political move, to the new self-rule government will be without problems , for among the East Timorese, factional interest remain obvious. Should the 1999 Parliament session in Jakarta approve Habibie s proposal, it will not be just a new era for the East Timorese but also involves the choosing between reconciliation or return to 1975. This is not an easy task but something that needs mutual reflection. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Didistribusikan tgl. 2 Feb 1999 jam 09:25:59 GMT+1 oleh: Indonesia Daily News Online <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.Indo-News.com/ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
