I disagree.

Payloads in a particular CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange should be specifically 
related to the SA being created.  The IKE_AUTH exchange is different, because 
it is used to set up everything we need to get an IPsec SA going.

We do not use the CREATE_CHILD_SA to delete old SAs, to query application 
versions or to advertise capabilities through notifications or Vendor IDs, so 
it should also not include IP address maintenance.  That's what INFORMATIONAL 
exchanges are for.


On Aug 27, 2009, at 2:05 PM, 
<pasi.ero...@nokia.com<mailto:pasi.ero...@nokia.com>> 
<pasi.ero...@nokia.com<mailto:pasi.ero...@nokia.com>> wrote:

I would repeat my comment from April:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipsec/current/msg04245.html

If we continue to allow CP in INFORMATIONAL exchange (and IMHO we should), it 
should be allowed in CREATE_CHILD_SA, too (with exactly same semantics).

Best regards,
Pasi

From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org<mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org> 
[mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of ext Yaron Sheffer
Sent: 26 August, 2009 00:23
To: ipsec@ietf.org<mailto:ipsec@ietf.org>
Subject: [IPsec] #79: Remove CP from Create_Child_SA?

Yoav:

Patricia noted in a post to the IPsec mailing list (12/12/2008) that section 
2.19 says that "request for such a temporary address can be included in any 
request to create a CHILD_SA (including the implicit request in message 3) by 
including a CP payload."

IMO the normal way of doing things is in this message 3, so rather than a 
parenthetical remark, it's really the only one anyone uses.  I don't think it 
makes sense to assign a different IP address for each SA, and I don't think 
anyone actually intended for this to be implied.

In RFC 4306, section 3.15, one of the attributes that can be sent in the CP 
payload is the INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY. That would be the length of time before 
the client needs to renew the address with the gateway (probably renew the 
lease with a DHCP server). With such an attribute, it made sense for the client 
to renew the address along with rekeying some CHILD_SA.

In the bis document, we've deprecated this attribute, and it is now marked as 
"RESERVED". Since we've done that, I suggest we remove the CP payload from the 
Create Child SA exchange in appendix A, and reword section 2.19 to reflect that 
requesting an IP address is only acceptable during IKE_AUTH.


Everyone, please comment on the above, even if you support Yoav’s proposal. 
This would be a protocol change (even if we don’t understand what the current 
semantics is…), so we shouldn’t do it unless we’re quite sure.

Thanks,
            Yaron

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