Can someone please explain the joke to me? Nelson was asked about TLS-PSK (RFC 4279) and he replied that it can easily be abused. TLS-PSK (similarly to IKE-PSK) is vulnerable to dictionary attacks if used with a short secret (a.k.a. "password"), at least in the presence of an active attacker. So I think his response was entirely appropriate. What am I missing?
Thanks, Yaron > -----Original Message----- > From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf > Of Blumenthal, Uri - 0662 - MITLL > Sent: Thursday, March 04, 2010 19:09 > To: 'pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz' > Cc: 'ipsec@ietf.org'; 'c...@irtf.org' > Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Cfrg] Beginning discussion on secure password- > only authentication for IKEv2 > > Well, during my long and fruitful career I've come across many asinine > statements - but this pearl from your collection outshines mine! Indeed > "straight from the horse's" (or in the context - "mule's"?) mouth (no > offense meant to those wonderful equestrians). > > I'm struck speechless (which is unusual, as anybody who knows me would > confirm :-). > > Regards, > Uri > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: pgut001 <pgut...@wintermute02.cs.auckland.ac.nz> > To: pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz <pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz>; Blumenthal, > Uri - 0662 - MITLL > Cc: c...@irtf.org <c...@irtf.org>; ipsec@ietf.org <ipsec@ietf.org> > Sent: Wed Mar 03 18:20:53 2010 > Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [IPsec] Beginning discussion on secure password- > only authentication for IKEv2 > > "Blumenthal, Uri - 0662 - MITLL" <u...@ll.mit.edu> writes: > > >On the vendor side - perhaps EKE patent concern was the cause (you > >implement/sell free SRP and get slapped with EKE licensing)? And the > users > >found alternative solutions in the meanwhile? > > Nope. It's been supported in OpenSSL since 0.9.9, but not in any > browser. > The reason for not supporting it in Firefox is so astonishingly > boneheaded > that I'll quote the original message to make sure that it's straight > from the > horse's mouth ("PSK cipher suites" = non-patent-encumbered EKE in TLS- > talk): > > -- Snip -- > > Subject: Re: NSS implementation of TLS-PSK/ RFC 4279 > Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2008 14:01:10 -0700 > From: Nelson B Bolyard <nel...@bolyard.me> > Reply-To: mozilla's crypto code discussion list > <dev-tech-cry...@lists.mozilla.org> > > jeng...@berkeley.edu wrote, On 2008-10-14 13:52 PDT: > > I was wondering if implementation of TLS-PSK (RFC 4279) is currently > in > > development. I do not see it in the current NSS source or roadmap. > Thank > > you for any help. > > > > -John Engler > > No. There are no plans to include any PSK cipher suites in NSS. > Because of the enormous potential for PSK cipher suites to be > misused by application developers, there is strong resistance to > incorporating them into NSS. > > -- Snip -- > > As for Microsoft, Opera, etc who knows? (If you work on, or have > worked on, > any of these browsers, I'd like to hear more about why it hasn't been > considered). I think it'll be a combination of two factors: > > 1. Everyone knows that passwords are insecure so it's not worth trying > to do > anything with them. > > 2. If you add failsafe mutual authentication via EKE to browsers, CAs > become > entirely redundant. > > So the browser vendors' approach is to ignore EKE and keep on waiting > for PKI > to start working, forever if necessary. "PKI meurt, elle ne se rend > pas!" [0]. > > Peter. > > [0] Hat tip to Luther Martin for the quote :-). > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list > IPsec@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec > > Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway. _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec