Hi Zaifeng,

 

About error condition, Is there any plan to add new error message types to
Notify payload to handle verification fail scenarios? I feel it would
appropriate to inform FAP, so this helps FAP to correct if misconfigured.

 

I have one more question about the proposed solution. Can’t we handle
verifying FAP configuration information inside Femto Gateway? Femto Gateway
can inform security gateway to bring down the tunnel, if verification fails.
Anyway false information submission very unlikely scenario, so why we need
to make this config payload exchange as part of regular IKE negotiation? I
feel addition of more config payloads might impact tunnel setup rate.

 

Regards,

Dharmanandana Reddy Pothula

 

From: zong.zaif...@zte.com.cn [mailto:zong.zaif...@zte.com.cn] 
Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2012 1:51 PM
To: dharmanandana.pothu...@huawei.com
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; ipsec-boun...@ietf.org; t...@zteusa.com
Subject: 答复: RE: [IPsec] [IPSec]: New Version Notification for
draft-zong-ipsecme-ikev2-cpext4femto-00.txt

 


Hi Dharmanandana: 

The notarized signature will not be sent oin every IPSec packet. It will be
sent to core network when the FAP registers to the core network inside the
signalling between the FAP and core network. After it is registered to the
core network, the FAP is activated to accept attachment of mobile terminals.
I wish this clarifies. Thanks! 

BR 
Zaifeng

  




Dharmanandana Reddy Pothula <dharmanandana.pothu...@huawei.com> 

2012-01-31 18:43 


请答复 给
dharmanandana.pothu...@huawei.com


收件人

t...@zteusa.com 


抄送

ipsec@ietf.org, ipsec-boun...@ietf.org, zong.zaif...@zte.com.cn 


主题

RE: [IPsec] [IPSec]: New Version Notification for
draft-zong-ipsecme-ikev2-cpext4femto-00.txt

 

                




Hi Tricci, 
  
Thanks for your explanation. I get your point why notarized signature
required, but my question is not about notarizing every packet. Let me ask
my question in different way, Is FAP sends notarized signature in every
IPSec packet to core network? As I understand from the draft that before
accepting every IPSec packet, core network validate the notarized signature.
Where is this notarized signature placed in every IPSec packet? 
Thanks, 
Dharmanandana Reddy Pothula 
  
From: t...@zteusa.com [mailto:t...@zteusa.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2012 1:26 PM
To: dharmanandana.pothu...@huawei.com
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; ipsec-boun...@ietf.org; zong.zaif...@zte.com.cn;
t...@zteusa.com
Subject: Re: [IPsec] [IPSec]: New Version Notification for
draft-zong-ipsecme-ikev 
  
Dear Dharmanandana, 

I hope that I address you correctly.  If not, please pardon my ignorance. 

As this week is spring festival, ZaiFeng is not available.  Hence, I would
like to respond to you on behalf of her.   

Could you please kind see my responses to you inline below.  Many thanks. 
Tricci 




5pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>Dharmanandana Reddy
<dharmanandana.pothu...@huawei.com> 
Sent by: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org 

01/24/2012 04:04 AM 

 


Please respond to
dharmanandana.pothu...@huawei.com

 


To 

zong.zaif...@zte.com.cn 


cc

ipsec@ietf.org 


Subject

Re: [IPsec] [IPSec]: New Version Notification for
draft-zong-ipsecme-ikev2-cpext4femto-00.txt


  

 

                





Hi Zaifeng, 
 
I have following questions and concerns about your proposed solution "The
FAP will then send the FAP information together with the corresponding SeGW
notarized signature to its mobile operator's core network. The core network
verifies the FAP information by validating the SeGW notarized signature
prior to the acceptance of the information". 
Is every ip packet carries SeGW notarized signature after server sends
notarized signature to the client? if not, what's the point in returning
notarized signature to the client? I believe yes, if so, It will increase
percentage of overhead per packet and may impact quality of real time voice
and video. 

Tricci > You ask a very legitimate question.  May be our draft is not clear
enough to explain the main motivation of this draft for target of the
attack.   

Tricci > The main concern is not about the attack for "unauthorized FAP" to
send any data to the mobile core network.  The main concern is about the
attack of the "unauthorized FAP" to send the "false" configuration
information (e.g. such as changing the FAP from "Closed" to become "Open"
;false" access control related information (e.g. allowing a 3GPP UE which is
supposed to be allowed to access the FAP and to have the access privileage
to the FAP - i.e. CSG info alteration, etc.).  Once the FAP's configuration
and access control management are authenticated via the support of the
notarization by the SeGW, then, the rest of the 3GPP UEs' access to the FAP
can follow the existing access control and UE-based
authentication/authorization procedures at the UE level's.   

Tricci > Of course, once the UE is authenticated and to allow access to the
FAP, whatever the UE sends is beyond the control of the FAP just as what is
happened today for any mobile device.  Isn't it?   
 
if every ip packet carries SeGW notarized signature, How and where this
signature carried inside ip packet? cations inside IPsec packet processing?
Is this processing happens outside of IPsec? is it outside scope of this
document? It would be great, if some of these aspects are addressed in the
draft. 
 
Tricci > Since I have already explained to you that, we are not proposing to
notarize every single packet sent by FAP.  Hence, I don't think that I need
to respond to your rest of the questions above.   

Tricci > THANK YOU for asking a good question.  Cheers. 

Thanks, 
 
Dharmanandana Reddy Pothula. 
 
& yle='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"'>  
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