Hi Yoav, Valery,
Valery is right that the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange does not have a
protected payload.
But his new text is incorrect, since the (session resumption) ticket is
sent in IKE_SESSION_RESUME and not in the immediately following IKE_AUTH
(he might have got it mixed with the ticket sent when *requesting* a
ticket). So I guess we should just replace "within the protected payload
of the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange" by "within the IKE_SESSION_RESUME
exchange".
According to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christmas#Listing, it's still
more than a week until the Eastern Churches' Christmas. So Merry
Christmas to some of us, and a Happy New Year to all.
Thanks,
Yaron
On 12/26/2012 10:42 AM, Yoav Nir wrote:
Hi
I agree with point #2. I'll leave it to some of the session resumption experts
to comment on point #1.
It's a little late for "Merry Christmas", so just happy new year.
Yoav
-----Original Message-----
From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Valery Smyslov
Sent: Wednesday, December 26, 2012 8:11 AM
To: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: [IPsec] Error in RFC6290
Hi,
RFC6290 (Quick Crash Detection) contains an error. In Section 4.3 it states:
For session resumption, as specified in [RFC5723], the situation is
similar. The responder, which is necessarily the peer that has
crashed, SHOULD send a new ticket within the protected payload of the
IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange. If the Initiator is also a token maker,
it needs to send a QCD_TOKEN in a separate INFORMATIONAL exchange.
But IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange, as specified in RFC5723, doesn't contain any
protected payload - it is completely in clear and must be followed by IKE_AUTH
exchange. I suspect this error came from early versions of IKE SA Resumption
protocol that, as far as I remember, did contain protected payload. But
currently this para should look like:
For session resumption, as specified in [RFC5723], the situation is
similar. The responder, which is necessarily the peer that has
crashed, SHOULD send a new ticket in IKE_AUTH exchange
that immediately followed IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange.
If the Initiator is also a token maker, it needs to send a QCD_TOKEN in
the same IKE_AUTH exchange.
And one more consideration. In Section 4.1 RFC6290 states:
o Protocol ID (1 octet) MUST be 1, as this message is related to an
IKE SA.
o SPI Size (1 octet) MUST be zero, in conformance with Section 3.10
of [RFC5996].
I think here we have contradiction with RFC5996 (despite clamed conformance
with it). In abovementioned Section 3.10 it is written:
o Protocol ID (1 octet) - If this notification concerns an existing
SA whose SPI is given in the SPI field, this field indicates the
type of that SA. For notifications concerning Child SAs, this
field MUST contain either (2) to indicate AH or (3) to indicate
ESP. Of the notifications defined in this document, the SPI is
included only with INVALID_SELECTORS and REKEY_SA. If the SPI
field is empty, this field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be
ignored on receipt.
Let me emphasize that RFC5996 clearly requires that If the SPI field is empty,
Protocol ID field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be ignored on receipt, but
RFC6290 while requiring SPI field to be empty, requres Protocol ID field to be
non-zero. Actually, I see no value in this requirement, as Protocol ID MUST be
ignored on receipt anyway (if SPI field is empty), so it just complicates
protocol and makes it cumbersome.
Merry Christmas,
Valery Smyslov.
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