On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 08:10:35PM +0000, Graham Bartlett (grbartle) wrote:
> Great point. Puzzles a good tool that will be needed if/when ddos becomes
> a serious issue. (I can't think of a silver bullet which will solve this)

For VPN SGs using puzzles all the time would be fine, but for VPN
clients it'd be very rude to use them when acting as the responder!  The
protocol may be symmetric, but some uses aren't.

VPN clients probably don't talk to more than one SG at a time, so why
should they need puzzles at all?  For single-user VPN clients there's
not much of a DDoS problem.  Even for BITW uses...

For end-to-end IPsec using complex puzzles all the time would probably
not be useful at all, but using them as load goes up would be very
appropriate.

Responder load seems like a variable that always works for deciding when
to use puzzles and how complex they should be.  VPN clients generally
will never have too much IKE load, while SGs make tempting DDoS targets,
therefore SGs could definitely use puzzles when under attack.

Another variable worth using for determining puzzle complexity is the
responder's estimated cost of holding the half-open IK_SA and completing
the exchange.  For a protocol where the initiator can demonstrate having
recently been a productive peer there may be no need to make the
initiator spend a lot of time on puzzles -- no need to punish the
innocent parties, when you know who they are (but innocence is difficult
to determine).

> They should also not be mandatory (with the option to be configurable as
> per cookie notifications) as I would assume some hosts will never be able
> to support these.. 

Yes, but I'd rather we have a general recommendation with as simple a
configuration knob as possible and with a sensible default setting that
most will never need to change.  IKE load seems like the most sensible
variable to use in deciding when to use puzzles and how hard they should
be.

Specify the feature (puzzles) and provide general guidance as to when to
use it and how hard to make it on the initiator.

Nico
-- 

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