Hi, all

As mentioned in Tuesday's session, Ed448 and Ed25519ctx add a new parameter to 
the signature function: a context string. Setting this string to a different 
value for each application (where application could be "PKIX", "TLS", "IKE") 
leads to different results and thus a signature made in one context does not 
validate in another context. This reduces the attack surface for attacks 
involving signing oracles.

The CFRG draft suggests that "contexts SHOULD NOT be used opportunistically, as 
that kind of use is very error-prone.  If contexts are used, one SHOULD require 
all signature schemes available for use in that purpose support contexts". As I 
don't think this WG is ready to deprecate RSA, DSA, and ECDSA in one fell 
swoop, I think we should not use contexts. 

So I suggest to add the following paragraph at the end of section 2 of the 
eddsa draft:

   The context parameter for Ed448 MUST be set to the empty string.
   
Comments?

Yoav
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