On Aug 14, 2013, at 2:27 PM, Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpen...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> * Section 3: >>> To the extent that each method of IID creation specifies the values >>> of the "u" and "g" bits, and that each new method is carefully >>> designed in the light of its predecessors, these bits tend to reduce >>> the chances of duplicate IIDs. >> >> Not sure what you mean. Do you mean that *if* each IID-generation method >> were to use a different combination of "ug", colisions between them >> would be avoided? If so, I'd argue that since there's no coordination of >> which combinations should be used for which method, that's unfeasible. >> For instance, traditional SLAAC uses all combinations (modulo >> "illegal/unused" combinations of ug). > > The argument is fuzzy and the sentence needs to be rewritten. > > (I would actually suggest that in a pseudo-random method, now that we > are clear that the bits have no meaning, it would be best to use them to > provide two more bits of entropy rather than giving them fixed values.) Good grief. If the bits don't mean anything - and they never did, since nobody ever interpreted them except in IETF dancing-on-heads-of-pins discussions - could we simply say that they are as random in value as any of the other bits in the IID are? -------------------------------------------------------------------- IETF IPv6 working group mailing list ipv6@ietf.org Administrative Requests: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6 --------------------------------------------------------------------
