+1 "for being able to send unsigned content with JOSE objects" using a
structure that is parallel to signed content
I find symmetric models much less complex than asymmetric ones (maybe
I'm missing the symmetry of the other model).
In practice, most systems are only going to support a subset of the alg:
values anyway and so will have to check the value on every object to
ensure it's one of the ones supported for that library, or message, etc.
Filtering out 'none' is not difficult.
Thanks,
George
On 8/19/13 12:30 PM, Justin Richer wrote:
I don't normally jump into the discussion on this list, but I've been
using the output of JOSE for quite some time now and am a committer on
the NimbusDS JOSE JWT library. However, with tonight's call coming up
(which I won't be able to make) I wanted to jump in and say that from
my perspective, alg:none makes a lot of sense. There's a need for
being able to send unsigned content with JOSE objects, and that's been
pretty well established by others on the list here. As an implementor,
though, I think it makes the most sense to have the unsigned content
be parallel in structure to the signed content. When reading a string
and constructing objects, our library parses the header and dispatches
the parser based on the "alg" parameter.
And as Mike points out, alg:none has been in the spec as required to
implement for ages now, and it hasn't caused the horrible security
holes that people are predicting.
-- Justin
On 08/01/2013 07:23 AM, jose issue tracker wrote:
#36: Algorithm "none" should be removed
Comment (by [email protected]):
And sure enough, working groups across the IETF are having to
explicitly
forbid the use of null ciphersuites. They provide empirical
evidence that
this design pattern is a bad idea.
As I've pointed out before, you can add that verification
algorithm, but
you will not have a good time writing security considerations
around it.
Checking that you support "none" is not enough -- you have to check
that
*nothing* *else* in the header could possibly indicate that a
different
signature algorithm should be used.
So we have something that (1) causes a lot of spec work, (2) causes
security vulnerabilities under likely implementaiton designs, and
(3) has
no use case, and (4) will haunt us for years to come (how many
times do
you want to write 'MUST NOT use "alg":"none"'?). Sounds like a
recipe for
success!
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