From a consistency perspective: a. There are those that see everything as JWT tokens so a signature=none makes perfect sense for consistency b. There are those that see everything as JSON. JWT is seen as the edge case. Consistency means keeping things in plain old JSON.
Phil @independentid www.independentid.com [email protected] On 2013-08-19, at 10:17 AM, George Fletcher <[email protected]> wrote: > +1 "for being able to send unsigned content with JOSE objects" using a > structure that is parallel to signed content > > I find symmetric models much less complex than asymmetric ones (maybe I'm > missing the symmetry of the other model). > > In practice, most systems are only going to support a subset of the alg: > values anyway and so will have to check the value on every object to ensure > it's one of the ones supported for that library, or message, etc. Filtering > out 'none' is not difficult. > > Thanks, > George > > On 8/19/13 12:30 PM, Justin Richer wrote: >> I don't normally jump into the discussion on this list, but I've been using >> the output of JOSE for quite some time now and am a committer on the >> NimbusDS JOSE JWT library. However, with tonight's call coming up (which I >> won't be able to make) I wanted to jump in and say that from my perspective, >> alg:none makes a lot of sense. There's a need for being able to send >> unsigned content with JOSE objects, and that's been pretty well established >> by others on the list here. As an implementor, though, I think it makes the >> most sense to have the unsigned content be parallel in structure to the >> signed content. When reading a string and constructing objects, our library >> parses the header and dispatches the parser based on the "alg" parameter. >> >> And as Mike points out, alg:none has been in the spec as required to >> implement for ages now, and it hasn't caused the horrible security holes >> that people are predicting. >> >> -- Justin >> >> On 08/01/2013 07:23 AM, jose issue tracker wrote: >>> #36: Algorithm "none" should be removed >>> >>> >>> Comment (by [email protected]): >>> >>> And sure enough, working groups across the IETF are having to explicitly >>> forbid the use of null ciphersuites. They provide empirical evidence >>> that >>> this design pattern is a bad idea. >>> >>> As I've pointed out before, you can add that verification algorithm, but >>> you will not have a good time writing security considerations around it. >>> Checking that you support "none" is not enough -- you have to check that >>> *nothing* *else* in the header could possibly indicate that a different >>> signature algorithm should be used. >>> >>> So we have something that (1) causes a lot of spec work, (2) causes >>> security vulnerabilities under likely implementaiton designs, and (3) has >>> no use case, and (4) will haunt us for years to come (how many times do >>> you want to write 'MUST NOT use "alg":"none"'?). Sounds like a recipe >>> for >>> success! >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> jose mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose >> >> > > -- > _______________________________________________ > jose mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
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