>> As a side note, my impression is that gss-keyex has fallen out of favor, >> and at least for us part of the problem is the unfortunate decision >> to use MD5 in that protocol. You and I both know that the use of MD5 >> in there isn't security related, but if you live in a FIPS world >> then any use of MD5 is a "challenge". > >What MD5? It's used for generating a mechanism name, which has no >security implications. You can hardcode the OID->name mappings so you >don't invoke MD5.
Ever hear the political adage, "If you're explaining yourself, you're losing"?. The same adage applies when talking to security people, especially the non-technical ones. The common gss-keyex code out there calls the OpenSSL MD5 function at runtime, and some of the distributions that do ship the gss-keyex code (RedHat) decided to simply disable gss-keyex code when FIPS is turned on. So yes, you CAN hardcode the OID->name mappings, but it seems that nobody actually does that. --Ken ________________________________________________ Kerberos mailing list Kerberos@mit.edu https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos