>So what can you do? Well, you could build an online kerberized CA that >vends short-lived OpenSSH-style certificates, then use that for SSH. > >Perhaps you'll find that easier to do than to send a PR for hard-coding >mechanism OID->name mappings, and even if not, you may find it better >for the long term anyways because it's fewer patches to maintain.
Unfortunately, ANOTHER one of the "fun" rules I live under is, "Thou shall have no other PKI than the DoD PKI". And as much as I can legitimately argue for many of the unusual things that I do, I can't get away with that one; we have to personally certify on all of our server systems that we only accept DoD issued certificates. The available DoD certificate profiles are EXTREMELY limited and there's exactly zero chance of me getting our own CA under the DoD PKI. So I am aware of kx509 and the like, but I can't use them. Well, I technically COULD set it up, I just couldn't trust a kx509 CA on any of our own systems so the utility would be limited. >Though credential delegation becomes hairy since all you can do then is >ssh-agent forwarding, and if you need Kerberos credentials on the target >end well, you won't get them unless you build yet another bridge where >you have your online kerberized CA vend certificates for use with PKINIT >so that you can kinit w/ PKINIT using a private key accessed over the >forwarded ssh-agent. We _do_ do PKINIT with the DoD PKI today; that is relatively straightforward with the exception of dealing with certificate revocation (last time I checked the total size of the DOD CRL package was approximately 8 million serial numbers, sigh). >I'm a big proponent of authentication protocol bridging. I've written >an online kerberized CA in Heimdal, though that one doesn't [yet] vend >OpenSSH-style certificates. One site I'm familiar with has a kerberized >JWT, OIDC, and PKIX certificate issuer, and they support PKINIT, so they >can and do bridge all the tokens and all the Kerberos realms and all the >PKIX and soon OpenSSH CAs. We KIND do bridging, but it's at a higher level; since almost everyone we deal with has an issued PKI client certificate on a smartcard we tend to support a bunch of ways of working with that. So you can use your client certificate do a bunch of things like get a Kerberos ticket, but we can't turn a Kerberos ticket into a DOD PKI client certificate. There is an DoD program called "Purebred" to get DERIVED client PKI credentials on things like iOS devices but that again has a very small box it is designed to fit in and I doubt that the people who run it would understand what I was asking, much less make it so I could put those credentials in a kx509 server. Sigh. >Therefore I have no problem with you not using SSHv2 GSS-KEYEX. I mean, it seems like gssapi-with-mic is relatively widely supported and works (with the previously-discussed exception of the broken-assed Tenable client and Heimdal servers). --Ken ________________________________________________ Kerberos mailing list Kerberos@mit.edu https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos