>X-Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Unverified) Caucasus Oil Politics. Sudan Politics >Subject: Caucasus Oil. Sudan today > >War in the Caucasus >The Politics of Oil > >In the early years of the 20th century, oil from the Russian Caucusus >accounted for nearly half of all oil produced in the world. The oil >district of Grozny was, next to Baku, the most important Russian oil >area before the revolution and by 1915 accounted for about 18 per >cent of Russian oil production. > >by Kenny Coyle > >More than half the investment in [pre-Revolutionary] Russian oil came >from abroad. Before World War I, total investment in the Russian oil >industry was US$214 million, US$130 million of which represented >foreign capital. Great Britain was particularly active in Russia, >providing more than 60 per cent of the foreign capital. > >In the Soviet Union, Grozny oil was at one time quite >important, accounting for one-third of national production in 1932. >In the post-Soviet era the importance of Grozny oil for the >Russian economy has diminished greatly but its importance as a >regional producer has increased. > >Over the years, Grozny became a key oil pipeline crossroads, an oil >refining centre and also a juncture for natural gas from fields in >Russia and Central Asia. > >The vast oil fields of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and in >the North Caucasus of Russia have always been a target for invasion. >It was to secure unimpeded access to these riches, as much as for the >symbolic associations with the city's name, that Hitler threw >division after division at Stalingrad in World War II. > >The break-up of the Soviet Union has released these >enormous resources that had been denied to Western >transnational corporations for decades. This is an enormous boon for >Western imperialism. > >Prising open the oil fields grouped beneath and around the Caspian >Sea has been a key strategic target of the US in the past decade. > >BP Amoco, Texaco, Mobil, Chevron and other US and foreign companies >have already spent over a billion dollars on developing the Caspian >oil resources. > >They are drawing on a whole spectrum of Cold War foreign >policy figures from the US and Britain to cash in on the region. > >Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser under President >Carter and a key figure in securing initial US support for the Afghan >mujahidin, is a consultant to Amoco. > >James Baker, a former US Secretary of State, runs a law practice in >Houston doing business for the oil companies, where he is able to use >his friendship with his former Soviet counterpart >Edward Shevardnadze, now President of Georgia. > >Former US National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, >advises Pennzoil and the multinational Azerbaijan consortium. > >Dick Cheney, President Bush's Secretary of Defence, is now >chief executive of Halliburton of Houston, the world's largest >oilfield services company. > >Azerbaijan is also a favourite destination for the British >oil companies such as Monument and Ramco. Timothy Eggar, who >as British Energy Minister led a delegation to Baku in 1994, is >now chief executive of Monument Oil, while former Foreign >Minister Malcolm Rifkind sits on the board of Ramco. > >In October 1997, "Le Monde Diplomatique" wrote: "The negotiation of >oil contracts enabled Washington to show a direct interest in the >region. The US Government sees it as an extra source of energy, >should Persian Gulf oil be threatened. > >"It also wants to detach the former Soviet republics from Russia both >economically and politically, so as to make the formation of a >Moscow-led union impossible. > >"In an article published in the spring, former [US] Defence Secretary >Caspar Weinberger wrote that if Moscow succeeded in dominating the >Caspian, it would achieve a greater victory than the expansion of >NATO would be for the West." > >US policy therefore has both a tactical economic aspect and a longer- >term strategy to further weaken Russia. > >The most crucial question for oil supply though is the route chosen >for delivery. Unlike the Persian Gulf, none of the oil producing >states of the Caucasus offer the possibility of shipment to the West >by tanker, since the Caspian Sea is essentially a huge inland lake. > >The alternative is the construction of a super pipeline from Central >Asia to either the Mediterranean or the Persian Gulf. > >The Russians put together a Caspian Pipeline Consortium to run >a pipeline from the Tengiz fields of Kazakhstan across Russia to the >port of Novorossisk on the Black Sea and to link this with a pipeline >extending northwest from Baku. > >However, to do this the pipeline from Baku would have to run through >either Chechnya, or neighbouring Dagestan, itself the target of >several Chechen mujahidin incursions in August 1999. > >The US Government, however, insisted from the outset that >the pipeline, expected to carry one million barrels per day, run >from the Azerbaijani capital, Baku, to Turkey's Mediterranean port >of Ceyhan. > >Washington's aim is to ensure that oil supplies are free from Russian >and Iranian influence. > >The Istanbul Protocol [an agreement to build the Baku- >Ceyhan pipeline], signed late last year during the OSCE conference >in the Turkish city, is a significant victory for the plans of the US >and Turkey. > >"The New York Times" of November 19, 1999, bluntly described it as >"one of President Clinton's cherished foreign policy projects, a >pipeline that would assure Western control over the potentially vast >oil and natural gas reserves". > >US Secretary of Energy, Bill Richardson, enthused: "This is a major >foreign policy victory. It is a strategic agreement that advances >America's national interest." > >Inevitably, many Russians believe that destabilisation in >the Caucasus represents a Western plot to monopolise energy >resources in the region. While this has a certain simplistic aspect >to it, ignoring as it does the other complex factors, it >nonetheless expresses a certain truth. > >The expansion of Western imperialist influence eastward demands the >further break-up of Russia and the wresting of her rich energy >resources from her grasp, piece by piece. > > by "Morning Star" > > ********************* > >The situation in the Sudan > > A statement by the Sudanese Communist Party > >In 1998, after 10 years of the rule of the National Islamic >Front (NIF) and its military wing within the Sudanese Army, the >elderly politicians of the ruling party, including the ideologue of >the regime, Dr Hassan al-Turabi, reached the conclusion that >the Sudanese Islamic movement represented by the NIF and its >allies had failed markedly to realise its "Islamic Civilisation >Project" and to become a model for the Islamic world. > >It had also clearly failed to implement its salvation mission >to reform the moral, political, economic life in Sudan and to resolve >the civil war and thereby cement national unity as promised in the >first statement of the Salvation Military Council after the coup in >June, 1989. > >As a consequence, they were forced to retreat, while >still manoeuvring hard to preserve the maximum amount possible of >their political power, credibility and wealth. > >They opted in the course of that year for a quasi-democracy, >and engineered an "Islamic constitution" that listed >fundamental freedoms subject to the conditions and restrictions of >the relevant laws. > >This means, for example, that freedom of association is restricted by >the Political Parties Act and the Trade Union Act, which ex- >communicated the political parties and the trade unions incorporated >under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). > >Similarly, freedom of the press is restricted by the Press >and Publication Act. > >Nevertheless, these limited freedoms opened the door for >the opposition to activate inside the country and for the press >to criticise the wide-spread corruption in public tenders, in >state sector privatisation projects, in imports of spoiled foods >and drugs. > >The press and opposition were also able to criticise the financial >and administrative corruption of senior officials in central and >state governments, state authorities' intimidation of traditional >businessmen in favour of NIF parasitic capital and also to expose the >government policies that led to the collapse of education and health >services and the unprecedented spread of redundancy and unemployment. > >The press also covered the news of the protest actions of workers, >teachers, tenants and students inside the country and the activities >of the opposition especially the NDA abroad. > >The "Islamic" demagoguery and taboos of the regime were exposed and >people openly made fun of them. The fanatics and hawks of the regime >were provoked as well as scared by this political turmoil. > >They grouped themselves behind General Omar al-Bashir in his power >rivalry with Dr Hassan al-Turabi and pushed the General to advocate >their views and become their official voice. > >Last year, to avoid unconditional defeat, the regime attempted >a counter attack to contain internal political developments >and prevent them from exploding into a popular uprising. > >It embarked on an offensive to isolate the NDA, split its unity and >weaken its forces. > >In aspiring to gain new ground both internally, regionally >and internationally, the regime is hoping to strengthen its grip >over the Sudan and to have strong cards in any coming negotiation >with the SPLA [Sudan People's Liberation Army] and the NDA. > >It is in this context, that in May, 1999, Turabi met in Geneva with >Sayed al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, former Prime Minister, president of the Umma >party and one of the prominent leaders of the opposition. > >This activity served to focus regional and international attention on >the political situation in Sudan and the possible peaceful and global >solution to its problems. > >A number of foreign players entered actively the political game in >the Sudan. Each is motivated by its own interests. > >The government of the Sudan has been campaigning throughout >the western countries to demonstrate that political reform is >afoot and a new era of democracy has begun. > >It is also busy reassuring the West that the Sudanese Government has >been adopting a neo-liberal market economy and implementing IMF >prescriptions to the letter. > >Last June the IMF confirmed this fact and praised the >Sudanese Government. > >The regime is cynically exploiting the post-cold war >economic competition between the USA and the European >Community, especially the tug of war between the USA and France in >Africa, to release itself from the international isolation it has >been in since its crackdown on the professional community in the >Sudan after the doctors' strike in November, 1989. > >It is also successfully playing the card of oil exploration and the >privatisation of state assets. > >Now countries like France, Germany, Britain, Norway, the Netherlands >and Italy are hurrying to normalise their relations with the Sudanese >Government, leaving behind all their moral rhetoric about human >rights, democracy and international terrorism. > >There are reports that the regime is also offering the >US administration a strategic alliance so that the Sudan can be >the springboard for US strategic plans to control the present >and future sources of oil and mineral production in Africa and >the Red Sea. The anti-US public statements of the regime >are addressed to Africa, the Arab world and for local consumption. > >Regionally, the Sudanese regime tried to exploit the consequences of >the armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and between Uganda >and Democratic Congo in an attempt to isolate the NDA and the SPLA >and deny them the support of the neighbouring countries. > >The Sudanese Government even asked the latter to extradite Sudanese >opposition leaders living there in exile, but in vain. > >In the Arab world, the regime in Sudan is playing a dangerous game >and harming Sudan's national interests by projecting the problems of >the country as an ethnic and religious conflict, as rivalry between >Arab and African stocks and between Islam and Christianity. In this >way the regime hopes to gain the support of Moslems and Arab >nationalists. > >Unfortunately, this game is facilitated and heated by the >Western media, Christian fundamentalist institutions and the quarters >of Islamic fundamentalism. We believe that the problems of the >Sudan have to be solved globally and once and for all. > >The conflict in the Sudan is triggered and sustained by political, >civil, economic, social, cultural and regional injustices as well as >denial of equality based on citizenship and the concentration of >political power and wealth in the hands of the elite of central >Sudan. > >We have to learn from South Africa's experiences in building national >unity and national consensus and the smooth transition to multi- >racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious democracy and civil >society. > >We must hold a Constitutional Conference of Sudanese political forces >to dismantle the present totalitarian regime and to get rid of all >forms of injustice and inequality in our political systems since >independence. > >The present regime in the Sudan is not transformable and >the appropriate solution is to dismantle it altogether. All >genuine selfless foreign initiatives have to co-ordinate their >efforts so that Sudanese political forces can reach this goal." JC > > __________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki - Finland +358-40-7177941, fax +358-9-7591081 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.kominf.pp.fi ___________________________________ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subscribe/unsubscribe messages mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________
