>STOP NATO: NO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.HOME-PAGE.ORG > >http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00postol.html > > >March/April 2000 >Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 30-35 > > >by Theodore A. Postol > > > >The Clinton administration is relentlessly moving >toward an ill-informed decision this summer to deploy >an untested and fundamentally unworkable national >missile defense (NMD) system. The administration >claims this technically flawed defense is needed to >negate an unproven long-range missile threat posed by >"rogue" states. >Departments >Home >Back Issues >Spanish Edition >Nuclear Notebook >Bulletin Newswire >Book Reviews >Special Topics >Site Map >Search > > >The cost of this defense will not simply be measured >in dollars. It may include an end to further nuclear >arms reductions with Russia, an increased Chinese >effort to expand its nuclear forces in response to the >defense, negative reactions from U.S. allies in Europe >and East Asia--who know that their security will also >suffer from this ill-thought out American >initiative--and an eventual collapse of global arms >control and nonproliferation efforts. > >The Clinton administration, already confronted by >strongly negative and adverse public reactions from >Russia and China, insists that this defense system >would not upset global efforts to reduce the dangers >from existing nuclear arsenals and potential nuclear >proliferants. > >Instead, the administration sticks to its false claim >that the proposed system will be sharply limited, and >that it will not compromise Russia's retaliatory >deterrent forces. > >Although Iran and Iraq have been named as targets of >this defense, North Korea is the alleged serious and >immediate threat. But if the proposed national missile >defense system is to be aimed principally at North >Korean missiles, why is the United States deploying a >radar that is ideally suited for gathering >intelligence for such a system on the northern tip of >Norway, less than 40 miles from the Russian border? > > > > >The mysterious Vardo radar, with inflatable dome (top >of page) and after the dome was blown off by a >November storm. >[Norwegian Defense Forces photo] > > > >Strawmen > >On September 8 and 9 in Moscow, Deputy Secretary of >State Strobe Talbott presented Russia with a proposal >to modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to allow >the United States to deploy a light but rapidly >expandable national missile defense system. > >Talbott told the Russians that if they did not accept >the U.S. proposal, the United States would simply >withdraw from the treaty and proceed on its own. > >Not surprisingly, the Russians viewed Talbott's >statements as a threat and an ultimatum rather than as >a proposal for serious and honest discussion about >matters of fundamental importance to both nations. > >Talbott's heavy-handed approach to the Russians was >another notch in a perfectly consistent record of >Clinton administration actions that add up to a >coherent pattern of hostility and deception toward >Russia. This record has created throughout the Russian >political system a deep distrust of and anger toward >the United States. > >In its seven-plus years, the Clinton administration >has piled blunder upon blunder in dealing with Russia. >The administration's initiative to expand NATO >eastward has created a constant threat that the United >States and Russia will stumble into an unwanted crisis >that could easily escalate to nuclear alerts. > >The administration's continued emphasis on maintaining >a hair-trigger nuclear strike force serves no >constructive purpose and endangers the United States, >Russia, and the rest of the world by threatening >Russia's increasingly vulnerable nuclear forces. > >And now the Russians have been presented with an >insulting pretense that the United States is >vulnerable to long-range missile attacks from the >likes of North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. > >The latter two countries have no substantive >long-range missile programs. Although North Korea does >have a program, it is based on primitive, scaled-up >Scud technology. > >The Russian Scud is based on the work of German >engineers captured by the Russians at the end of World >War II. The Scuds themselves consist of modest >improvements over the German V-2 missile, first flown >by Nazi Germany in the early 1940s. > >Despite the vast resources available in Nazi Germany, >and the dedicated and well-supported national effort >in the Soviet Union that followed, the first ICBM was >not achieved until 1957. The United States now tells >the Russians that it has an urgent need for a national >missile defense to protect itself from an imminent >ICBM attack from a state that has a gross domestic >product smaller than Delaware's. > >Against a backdrop of years of misrepresentations by >the Clinton administration, the North Korean, Iranian, >and Iraqi "threat" is seen as a strawman by the >Russians and Chinese. > >The Russians and the Chinese also understand that the >administration's "limited" defense is in fact a system >that is indistinguishable from one aimed at them. They >correctly understand the full technical implications >of the administration's proposed battle-management >upgrades of early warning radars at Fylingdales Moor, >Britain; Thule, Greenland; Grand Forks, North Dakota; >and Clear, Alaska. These upgrades are exactly those >that would be needed for a national missile defense >system aimed at Russia and China. > >And now comes the most recent addition to the array of >misrepresentations to the Russians--installation of a >state-of-the-art, NMD-capable radar in Vardo, >virtually on the Russian border. > >The administration claims that the radar's purpose is >tracking space debris in earth orbit. It is obvious to >any technically informed person that this claim is >simply another misrepresentation. > > > >A poke in the eye > >The certain principal use of this X-band radar, along >with a second one planned for Eareckson Air Station on >Shemya Island, some 1,500 miles south west of >Anchorage, will be to collect detailed intelligence >data on Russia's long-range ballistic missiles. > >This data will cover the entire trajectory of the >missiles, including their powered flight, "bus" >maneuvers, deployment of warheads and countermeasures, >and reentry into the Pacific near the Kamchatka >peninsula. > >The data collected by these radars will be of primal >value to a U.S. national missile defense system. The >information will be fed into the NMD data base, which >will increase the discrimination capabilities of the >proposed system against Russia's ballistic missiles. > >It is not clear that the Vardo radar, code-named HAVE >STARE, is a formal violation of the Antiballistic >Missile (ABM) Treaty. But it is clear that the radar >could be added to an NMD sensor system in a way that >would unmistakably violate the intent if not the >letter of the treaty. > >It is also clear, both to Washington and Moscow, that >the basic infrastructure of the proposed limited >national missile defense system could be rapidly >scaled up to become an overtly anti-Russian system. > >The Vardo radar may be "treaty compliant." But it is >also one more threatening and insulting poke in the >eye of the Russian bear. > > > >Fingerprinting > >The HAVE STARE radar was developed in the early 1990s >by Raytheon, under the direction of the Electronic >Systems Center, the air force's lead organization for >the development and acquisition of command-and-control >systems. According to the Defense Department, HAVE >STARE is "a high-resolution X-band tracking and >imaging radar with a 27-meter mechanical dish >antenna." It became operational at Vandenberg Air >Force Base on California's coast in 1995, where it was >used in early developmental tests of the national >missile defense program. > >In late 1998, HAVE STARE was quietly dismantled and >sent to Norway, where it is being jointly reassembled >by the United States and Norway under the Norwegian >project name "Globus II." It is located at a Norwegian >military intelligence facility and its mission, >according to the U.S. and Norwegian governments, is to >track and catalog space junk in high earth orbit. > >Space junk is no trivial matter. There are many >thousands of manmade objects orbiting earth, ranging >in size from paint flecks and nuts and bolts to >booster rockets. But the new location of the HAVE >STARE radar, publicly revealed in April 1998 by Inge >Sellevag, a Norwegian newspaper reporter, is nearly >the last place on earth one would choose for a radar >with the purpose of tracking space debris. Because >many objects of concern are in orbits that can never >be seen from a far north location, a space tracking >installation is in fact best placed much closer to the >equator. > >But the location of the radar is ideal for collecting >very precise data on Russian missile tests. The Vardo >machine is--at least for now--the most advanced >tracking and imaging radar in the world. > >The HAVE STARE radar potentially has a resolution of >roughly 10 to 15 centimeters, which means it could >provide detailed radar images of Russian warheads and >decoys. In contrast, U.S. early warning radars have a >resolution of--at best--5 to 10 meters. > >When a pulse from the Vardo X-band radar illuminates a >target, reflections are generated mostly by the >numerous edges, surfaces, and other geometric details >of the target. These distinct reflections are, in >effect, a radar-fingerprint of the object. > >Because the radar-fingerprint of an object varies with >the frequency of the radar, it is especially important >that the Vardo radar operate in the X-band, the same >frequency range of the NMD X-band radars. > >In addition, the radar signal will not simply be a >complex mix of the many individual reflections. The >signal will fluctuate in time as the targets of >interest rotate and precess, providing yet additional >fingerprint data that could be exploited by the NMD >X-band radars. > >In short, the Vardo radar can provide critical >information for a national missile defense system >aimed specifically at Russia. > >Further, the Vardo radar and the planned radar for >Shemya Island at the western end of the Aleutians >could, operating together, collect precision radar >signature data on virtually every phase of Russian >tests of missiles and decoys, within minutes of launch >from the Plesetsk test range, about 150 miles south of >the White Sea, to splashdown 4,000 miles away, near >Kamchatka. > >Of particular importance, HAVE STARE will be able to >obtain precision signature data at X-band frequencies >and in mid-course--the critical point at which >warheads and decoys separate from the "bus." Previous >U.S. radars at Vardo and Shemya have lacked the >ability to perform such measurements at X-band >frequencies. > >Even though both the United States and the Soviet >Union (and now Russia) have long been capable of >defeating missile defense systems by deploying decoys >and other devices along with warheads, this >well-focused intelligence-gathering activity >understandably appears to the Russians as a determined >and planned step towards a U.S. National missile >defense capability aimed at Russia. The existence of >this radar at this location further adds to Russian >perceptions that the Clinton administration is again >being deceptive about its true intentions. > > > >What is "real time"? > >U.S. officials have said little about the export of >the HAVE STARE radar to Norway, leaving Norwegian >officials to explain its uses. [See "Vardo Exposed."] >Sellevag, a reporter with Bergens Tidende in Bergen, >Norway, stirred the pot in the spring of 1998 with >stories revealing that HAVE STARE was moving to Norway >and that it had a potential national missile defense >capability. > >In response, Dag Jostein Fjarvoll, Norway's secretary >of defense, assured parliament that the Globus II >radar (HAVE STARE) was "under full Norwegian control." >At best, that was misleading. Norwegian personnel may >man the system but the radar will be directly linked, >according to a viewgraph prepared by the air force's >Electronics Systems Center, to "Cheyenne Mountain and >NMD." (The nerve center of the proposed national >missile defense system will be buried deeply within >Colorado's Cheyenne Mountain.) > >This information clearly indicates that Fjarvoll's >assertions that the radar could not "contribute to any >eventual American defense" were false. Indeed, they >seemed deliberately crafted to mislead the Norwegian >parliament. > >The minister added that "only Norwegian personnel have >access to data in so-called real time." His use of >"real time" was repeated, perhaps for emphasis. "In >other words, there was no connection between Globus II >and the U.S. Air Force in real time. . . . The radar >can therefore not contribute to any eventual American >missile defense." > >To those not familiar with how acquisition and >tracking systems work--and members of the Norwegian >parliament surely fit that category--the no-real-time >argument might seem compelling. From a commonsense >point of view, if a sensor system does not supply data >in real time, it is useless for missile defense. > >In fact, none of the existing U.S. early warning and >tracking systems, or those projected for the national >missile defense system, operate in "real time"--as the >defense minister seems to define it. > >They are not real-time systems because they collect >vast amounts of data that are not sent directly to the >Cheyenne Mountain Complex. All of these systems--in >place and projected--extract critical information from >the mass of data after short processing delays. Once >the data are extracted, only then is it sent to >operational command centers. > >Each Defense Support Program satellite, for instance, >collects about 170 million bits of information per >second. These data are then sorted by a vastly >powerful signal processing system on the satellite. By >the time the data sorting is completed, only one >million bits per second are actually transmitted to >the ground. > >Once on the ground, the data are further processed. >That processing takes place in 10-second batches, >creating a vastly simplified but supremely accurate >surveillance "picture" of the earth below. In turn, >that information is updated and further processed >every 10 seconds. > >In cases where there is very clear data indicating a >missile launch, it takes 20 to 40 seconds before the >system can "initiate" tracking of the launch. The >operators of the system would not see this information >for 30 to 90 seconds, depending on specific >circumstances. > >Hence, the Defense Support Program satellites in high >earth orbit, currently the heart of the U.S. early >warning array, do not comprise a "real time" system >according to the definition implied by the statements >of Norway's defense minister. > > > >Why Norway? > >What is the purpose of the HAVE STARE radar at Vardo, >which the Norwegians call Globus II? Its purpose is >clear to the Russian civilian and military analysts I >have talked to. It is an intelligence-gathering system >optimized to collect data on Russian ballistic >missiles that can be directly used by a U.S. National >missile defense system aimed at Russia. > >The technical information on HAVE STARE released by >the U.S. Air Force and the Ballistic Missile Defense >Organization indicates that it is a very capable >tracking and imaging radar. Testimony given in >Congress and statements made elsewhere further confirm >this. On June 18, 1996, for instance, Rear Adm. >Richard D. West, then acting director of the Ballistic >Missile Defense Organization, testified before the >House National Security Committee about the NMD >program. > >In his testimony, he described plans to upgrade >existing early warning radars "for inclusion in the >NMD architecture." He added, "If needed, other >existing forward-based radars (such as Cobra Dane or >HAVE STARE) could also be used to support the NMD >system." > >More recently, Sellevag has tracked references to HAVE >STARE's potential usefulness to the NMD program. A >mid-1990s air force environmental impact statement >provided by the U.S. Air Force Atmospheric Interceptor >Technology Program, noted: > >"Two existing U.S. Air Force radar systems have high >potential for NMD application. The upgraded Precision >Acquisition Vehicle Energy-Phased Array Warning System >(PAVE PAWS) radar located at Beale Air Force Base >(AFB), California is a wide-looking potential target >detection element of a future NMD system. The HAVE >STARE tracking radar located at Vandenberg AFB, >California represents a candidate design to perform >the narrow-looking, target tracking radar role in a >future NMD system. > >"To fully understand the utility of these radar >systems in an NMD role, the [air force] plans to >integrate and test these systems using realistic >threat scenarios. California is the only location >where these radars are close enough to be tested >together. The PAVE PAWS radar initially detects an >incoming target and hands over specific target >tracking to the HAVE STARE." > >The tests were carried out. Two Minuteman III launches >were picked up by the Defense Support Program's early >warning satellites; in turn, that data cued PAVE PAWS >and HAVE STARE, which tracked the missiles. > >Sellevag documents that HAVE STARE was later involved >in two test flights in the NMD program. In June 1997, >a Minuteman II lifted off from Vandenberg with dummy >warheads and balloon decoys--targets for sensor >payloads aboard Boeing's Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, >launched from Kwajalein. A similar test of Raytheon's >entry into the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle sweep >stakes took place in January 1998. (Both tests were of >the sensors; no intercept of the target was >attempted.) > >Occasional air force and Ballistic Missile Defense >Organization briefing viewgraphs and slides allude, >directly or indirectly, to HAVE STARE in future NMD >architecture. One December 1999 slide produced by the >Strategic and Nuclear Deterrence Command-and-Control >Program Office shows HAVE STARE clustered with a host >of "Global Awareness" sensors, all of which are linked >to Cheyenne Mountain & NMD. > >Could HAVE STARE act as an early warning and tracking >radar if a national missile defense system is >deployed? Yes--but only as a backup to other sensors >closer to home or parked in safe orbits. > >The U.S. Air Force would have to assume that in the >event of an intentional missile attack by Russia, >Vardo would be immediately destroyed. (According to >Sellevag, the idea that the Vardo radar might put >northern Norway at the top of Russia's nuclear target >list has unsettled at least a few members of the >Norwegian parliament.) > >But the real value of the Vardo radar and of the >not-yet-built Shemya radar is that they can do >critical advance work for the national missile defense >system. They can collect radar >signatures--"fingerprints"--from a host of Russian >missiles, warheads, decoys, and other devices as they >are tested in east-west flight high above the Russian >hinterland. > >These fingerprints constitute vital information for >any system designed to counter the Russian missile >"threat," which must function perfectly within minutes >of the need to do so. A system that cannot quickly >separate warheads from everything else is fatally >flawed. > >If the purpose of a national missile defense system is >to protect the United States from North Korean >missiles, why is the world's most advanced tracking >and imaging radar about to go online at the northern >tip of Norway instead of northern Japan? > >Why Norway? is an especially intriguing question in >the context of the threats made last September by >Strobe Talbott to the Russians, when he said that the >United States was considering unilateral withdrawal >from the ABM Treaty > >Meanwhile, the administration may soon make a decision >to deploy a national missile defense that could well >end whatever momentum is left in the U.S.-Russian >strategic arms reduction process. > >The truth is that domestic politics in the United >States has led to false claims about the promise of >missile defense technology--as well as fantastic >claims about "emerging threats." > >Both the Republicans and the Democrats have been >involved in a charade trying to make each look less >concerned about national defense while they together >drive the United States toward a disaster of historic >proportions. > >If the administration decides this summer to deploy >the national missile defense system, it should at >least be honest about it. The Pentagon still defines >the principal missile threat as Russia, not North >Korea. That is why HAVE STARE is in northern Norway >instead of northern Japan. > > > >A new arms race? > >In his visit to Russia last September, Talbott assured >the Russians that the proposed system would only be >capable of handling "tens of missiles." Apparently >Talbott thought that would reassure the Russians and >not alarm the Chinese. > >But the Chinese have, according to the CIA, only 20 >missiles capable of reaching the United States. The >Chinese have long said that the proposed "limited" >system has an anti-Chinese face. And the Russians >clearly believe that a system that could be rapidly >expanded and upgraded looks like an anti-Russian >system. > >Talbott's words got an immediate response from Russia >and China. When I was in Moscow in October, only a few >weeks after Talbott's visit, I was told by several >government officials about a meeting in Beijing, from >which they had just returned. > >The meeting was sponsored by the foreign ministries of >Russia and China. However, most of the participants >were from the Russian and Chinese ministries of >defense. The purpose of the meeting was to begin >Russian and Chinese political and technical >cooperation to deal with the threat of a U.S. National >missile defense system. > >George N. Lewis, John Pike, and I published an article >in the August 1999 issue of Scientific American, which >attempted to show that the proposed U.S. National >missile defense system could be defeated by the >simplest of countermeasures. I personally know missile >experts in Russia and China, and they agree. > >A U.S. decision to deploy will nevertheless result in >a strong negative, coordinated, and unequivocal >reaction from Russia and China. This is because there >will be constant concerns that the United States may >eventually expand and modify the defense with >nuclear-armed interceptors instead of the pitiful >hit-to-kill interceptors now planned for the system. > >A modified and expanded nuclear system could also be >readily defeated, but the Russians and Chinese would >have to dedicate more resources to the task. Most >important: They might want to expand their offensive >capability, following the Nuclear Age dictum that a >good offense beats any defense. > >The Russians and Chinese also will not want to agree >to a cutoff in the production of fissile materials for >nuclear weapons. After all, they may need these >materials to expand their nuclear arsenals in response >to upgrades in U.S. missile defenses. > >They will want to reserve the option of nuclear >testing, so that new nuclear weapons designs--hardened >to the effects of U.S. nuclear interceptors--can be >tested. > >And they will certainly not be interested in engaging >in further arms reductions. Instead, they may need to >expand their forces in response to changes in the U.S. >National missile defense system. > >While this game is going on between the United States, >Russia, and China, the non-weapon state signatories to >the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will be watching >their security erode along with that of the three >great competing powers. Some states may choose to >withdraw from the treaty while others may choose to >stay. > >However, some of the states that withdraw may create >pressures on neighboring states to also withdraw, >especially if there are traditional tensions between >these states. > >Thus, a decade after the end of the Cold War, the >Clinton administration has put us on the path to a new >arms race and a breakdown of the entire international >regime of treaties that has been built over the past >30 years. > >It is bad enough if the administration simply does not >understand what it is doing. > >It is even worse if it does. > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >- >Theodore A. Postol is a professor of science, >technology, and national security policy at the >Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has worked >as a scientist at Argonne National Laboratory and on >missile-related issues at the Congressional Office of >Technology Assessment, and the Office of the Chief of >Naval Operations. He has done extensive work on the >Patriot anti-missile system's performance during the >1991 Gulf War. > > > > >©2000 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists > > > > > >__________________________________________________ >Do You Yahoo!? >Talk to your friends online with Yahoo! Messenger. >http://im.yahoo.com > > >______________________________________________________________________ >To unsubscribe, write to [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Start Your Own FREE Email List at http://www.listbot.com/links/joinlb > __________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. 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