>then abducted two Chechen policemen who were stationed in the village.
>
>The incident marks the second attack on Gantamirov's home in less than a
>year. Last winter, 11 Chechen fighters were killed and 20 wounded in a
>concerted attempt to storm the building. On this occasion, the raiders
>captured a local militiaman whose headless corpse was found a week later.
>
>Gantamirov has been a highly controversial figure since he was jailed for
>six years in 1998 for embezzling $5 million of government funds. Desperate
>to find an ally in the Chechen ranks, President Boris Yeltsin released
>Gantamirov from jail in November 1999 and gave him command of the
>pro-Russian militia.
>
>Under Gantamirov's leadership, the 2,500-strong force suffered heavy losses
>during the battle for Grozny, taking on policing duties in the capital after
>the rebel forces had withdrawn.
>
>In July, the Chechen leader was appointed deputy head of the civilian
>administration, under Akhmad Kadyrov, the republic's former mufti. Over the
>past five months, the bitter rivalry between the two men has become
>legendary and, on at least one occasion, Moscow has been forced to defuse a
>potentially violent confrontation.
>
>Of late, Gantamirov has made no secret of his suspicions that the federal
>high command is plotting his overthrow. He believes that his outspoken
>criticisms of the Russian campaign in Chechnya have made him enemies in the
>Kremlin where he is seen as a political loose cannon rather than a valuable
>ally.
>
>And, in Chechnya itself, Gantamirov has effectively burned his bridges. On
>November 15, all Chechens collaborating with the federal forces were
>officially condemned to death by President Aslan Maskhadov's outlawed
>regime.
>
>The announcement was followed by a spate of brutal assassinations. In late
>November, the head of a Chechen mountain district was decapitated together
>with his deputy. Days later, masked gunmen attacked the mayor of Gudermes,
>Malik Gazemiev, wounding his driver and his brother.
>
>Last Thursday, a kamikaze raider exploded a bomb outside the police
>headquarters in Gudermes, killing himself and wounding several Chechen
>militiamen.
>
>So far, however, none of the pro-Russian Chechen leaders have yielded to
>rebel pressure and abandoned their posts.
>
>Meanwhile, Gantamirov has gone back on the offensive, accusing "chameleon"
>Chechen policemen of collaborating with the separatists. He has announced
>plans to reform local police forces by increasing the number of "freelance"
>officers.
>
>All candidates will be interviewed by a special commission including FSB and
>interior ministry agents as well as representatives from the Grozny mayor's
>office - headed by none other than Bislan Gantamirov.
>
>Dmitri Nepomnyaschy is a regular IWPR contributor
>
>
>TUG OF WAR
>
>Russia and America play a tense game of political chess in the South
>Caucasus
>
>By Susanna Petrosian in Yerevan
>
>The South Caucasus has been described as the "last great theatre of the Cold
>War" with both Russia and America vying for the affections of the three
>former Soviet republics.
>
>But here the goal is not ideological victory but control over the oil and
>gas pipelines between the Caspian Sea and the West. And, to complicate
>matters still further, the newly independent states are proving they have
>minds of their own.
>
>Russia's Blue Stream ("Goluboy Potok") project -- a planned gas pipeline
>under the Black Sea between Russia and Turkey -- marks the latest attempt to
>the break the deadlock. The move is calculated to counterbalance the effects
>of a US-funded pipeline being built to transport Caspian oil through Georgia
>and into Turkey.
>
>Already ratified by the Russian and Turkish parliaments, Blue Stream could
>supply Turkey with more than 16 billion cubic metres of Russian gas every
>year. By 2005, nearly 60 per cent of Turkey's gas would be imported from
>Russia.
>
>The Russians make no secret of their ambitions. Rem Vyakhirev, chairman of
>Gazprom, comments, "Apart from the economic sense of the plan, it's vital
>for Russia to maintain geo-political influence in the region".
>
>The United States, on the other hand, has turned its attention to
>Turkmenistan in a bid to offer Turkey an alternative to Russian gas. Here
>plans are afoot to transport Turkmen gas across the Caspian, through
>Azerbaijan and into Turkey. The cost of the pipeline has been estimated at
>$2.5 billion.
>
>Azerbaijan, which will also use the facility to transport its own gas
>supplies, is set to begin construction of the pipeline from the Shakh-Deniz
>deposit by the end of this year.
>
>But the project has run into troubled waters. Turkmenistan is unhappy with
>the role being played by Azerbaijan in the project and is currently
>reviewing the possibility of selling gas to Russia and Iran.
>
>Alexander Iskandarian, director of the Centre for Caucasian Research in
>Moscow, says the situation - compounded with Azerbaijan's intention to
>export gas to Turkey independently - could eventually scupper the
>Trans-Caspian initiative.
>
>The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline consortium is making last-ditch attempts to
>defuse the crisis. Vice president Kevin Graham said that, if the Turkmen
>leadership refused to accept the terms of the agreement, Ankara would reject
>the Shakh-Deniz proposal in favour of Blue Stream.
>
>Meanwhile, Russia continues to pursue an aggressive foreign policy in the
>South Caucasus. Earlier this year, for example, at the insistence of the
>World Bank, Armenia excluded the Russian company Itera from an international
>tender to privatise the power supply network. Russia duly responded by
>cutting off its gas supplies to Armenia.
>
>As a result, the Armenian government decided to privatise the network in two
>stages - precluding the possibility of any one company monopolising the
>distribution network. The leadership in Yerevan was no doubt prompted by the
>bitter struggle then taking place between Itera and its American rival, AES
>Silk Road.
>
>According to David Petrosian, an analyst at the Noyan Tapan news agency, a
>subsequent law passed by the Armenian government which imposes tight
>controls on potential investors should "cool down" Silk Road's interests in
>the region.
>
>In Georgia at least, Itera has already emerged victorious over the American
>consortium. Georgia's debt to Itera is nearing $80 million and, earlier this
>year, Silk Road refused an invitation to take part in the privatisation of
>Tbilgaz -- a move which most analysts interpret as a recognition of Itera's
>preeminence in the region.
>
>At the same time, RAUES, the Russian electric power conglomerate, has
>stepped up its activities in the South Caucasus. RAUES has announced plans
>to invest around $800,000 in AO Pontoell, a consortium founded by energy
>companies from Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
>
>Ultimately, the West has little hope of breaking Russia's influence over the
>Caucasus region. Mkrtich Zardarian, senior expert at the Armenian Centre for
>National and Strategic Research, points out that US plans for the export of
>oil and gas without the participation of Russia and Iran are not only
>non-productive - they are also almost impossible to realise.
>
>Susanna Petrosian is a correspondent for the Noyan Tapan news agency in
>Yerevan
>
>
>THE LOST LAND OF SHAPSUGIA
>
>A new Russian law on "ethnic minorities" has given the Shapsug people fresh
>hope of reclaiming their historical homeland
>
>By Zarina Kanukova in Nalchik
>
>The "Shapsugia" newspaper is the last remaining mouthpiece of the Shapsug
>people - a tiny North Caucasian tribe who claim their way of life is
>threatened with extinction.
>
>"Shapsugia" may have a circulation of just 750 copies but it stands at the
>forefront of a stubborn movement to reclaim an ethnic homeland which was
>liquidated in 1945. And this, say the Shapsugs, is their last hope of
>preserving their ancient culture and traditions.
>
>In the beginning of the 18th century, the Shapsugs occupied a sizeable
>territory stretching from the River Pshada to the Kuban. In the 1830s, the
>first Russian expeditions into the Caucasus recorded a Shapsug population of
>up to 300,000 people.
>
>Today, there are just 10,000 Shapsugs living in scattered communities along
>the Black Sea coast. Isolated from their ethnic kin - the Cherkess, the
>Adygeans and the Balkars - they consider themselves a nation under threat.
>
>In many ways, they have managed to preserve their culture better than most -
>with family life based around the patriarchal aul and Islamic beliefs
>diluted with ancient pagan rituals. But, in the post-Soviet wilderness,
>unemployment and alcoholism are taking their toll whilst local officials
>have little patience for their ethnic concerns.
>
>Consequently, the "Shapsugia" newspaper is fighting a lonely battle. Deputy
>editor Anzor Nibo explains, "Only work and study can save a man from drink.
>But today there are few enough young people who can find themselves work and
>few enough parents who can send their children to school."
>
>Nibo went on to say that the Shapsug language was now only taught in the
>family circle while local television devoted just one programme a week to
>ethnic issues - and this was broadcast in Russian.
>
>The newspaper had been working closely with the Adyge Khase - a Shapsug
>council of elders -- to set up cultural and informational links with related
>ethnic groups across the North Caucasus. Approaches had been made to the
>International Cherkess Association, now based in Nalchik, but it soon became
>evident that their Adygean cousins had problems of their own...
>
>"Shapsugia's" editor, Aslanbi Khadjibramovich, is more outspoken. He claims
>the Shapsug people are literally faced with extinction. Low on cash and low
>on self-esteem, the younger generation are increasingly loathe to marry
>within their own ethnic group. The birth rate has never been lower.
>
>"If this continues," says Khadjibramovich, "we will simply disappear".
>
>The Shapsug nationalist movement was born in the early 1990s in a bid to
>reinstate the Shapsug autonomous enclave - part of the Krasnodarsky Region
>-- which was dissolved in May 1945.
>
>In May 1994, a Shapsug congress in the settlement of Shkhafit elected a
>"social parliament", the Adyge Khase, with 35 members and defined its
>long-term goals. Delegates called for national autonomy as well as concrete
>initiatives to protect the cultural identity and historical legacy of the
>Shapsug people.
>
>In June 1998, the Adyge Khase received backing from the Fourth Congress of
>the International Cherkess Association which pledged to "support the demands
>of the Black Sea Shapsugs for a legal strengthening of their rights as well
>as full representation in the Krasnodarsky regional administration and the
>reinstatement of Shapsug place names which were abandoned after the
>Caucasian wars of the 19th century."
>
>However, the Shapsug cause has progressed little in the last two years. The
>new Duma law introduced in March this year "to guarantee the rights of
>minority peoples in the Russian Federation" may have brought some hope.
>Among other privileges, it excuses members of any group numbering less than
>50,000 people from military service and promises a degree of
>self-determination.
>
>But M Chachukh, the president of the Adyge Khase, is philosophical. "It's
>pointless to demand the restoration of our ethnic homeland at this
>juncture," he says. "In fact, that's not our main concern at the moment. The
>main thing is that we've been granted the status of a 'minority people' and
>the rights that go with it."
>
>And yet there are fears that the new law could prove to be a double-edged
>sword, isolating the Shapsugs still further from their ethnic kin in the
>North Caucasus and creating a "pariah enclave" on the Black Sea coast.
>
>Even now, the locals are working hard to cash in on the tourist industry
>which is booming around Sochi. A resident of the Akhyntam settlement, Achmiz
>Aisa, has even turned his home into a tiny museum, dedicated to Shapsug
>culture. He tells his visitors traditional stories over a cup of tea and
>honey - and his guests have included Russian politicians, writers and
>emigres from Turkey, Syria and Jordan.
>
>One Shapsug 'migr', Utizh Mazhid, brings groups of Cherkess from Turkey to
>visit the Shapsug settlements. "Maybe one day some of them will want to
>return to Shapsugia and settle here," says Mazhid. At present, it is a very
>distant dream.
>
>Zarina Kanukova is a regular contributor to IWPR
>
>********* VISIT IWPR ON-LINE: www.iwpr.net **************
>
>IWPR's Caucasus Reporting Service provides the regional and international
>community with unique insiders' perspective on the Caucasus. Using our
>network of local journalists, the service publishes objective news and
>analysis from across the region upon a weekly basis.
>
>The service forms part of IWPR's Caucasus Project based in Tbilisi and
>London which supports local media development while encouraging better local
>and international understanding of a conflicted yet emerging region.
>
>IWPR's Caucasus Reporting Service is supported by the UK National Lottery
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>
>The institute will be launching a fourth news service, IWPR Central Asia
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>forthcoming news services, e-mail IWPR Programmes Officer Duncan Furey at
>[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>For further details on this project and other information services and media
>programmes, visit IWPR's Website: <www.iwpr.net>.
>
>Editor-in-chief: Anthony Borden. Managing Editor: Yigal Chazan; Assistant
>Editor: Alan Davis. Commissioning Editors: Giorgi Topouria in Tbilisi,
>Shahin Rzayev in Baku, Mark Grigorian in Yerevan, Michael Randall and Saule
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>
>The Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) is a London-based independent
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>
>Lancaster House, 33 Islington High Street, London N1 9LH, United
>Kingdom.Tel: (44 171) 713 7130; Fax: (44 171) 713 7140. E-mail:
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>
>The opinions expressed in IWPR's Caucasus Reporting Service are those of the
>authors and do not necessarily represent those of the publication or of
>IWPR.
>
>Copyright (c) IWPR 2000
>
>IWPR'S CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE, NO. 61
>
>-- ### --
>
>
>
>{#} ----------------------------------------------------+[ crsenglish ]+---
>
>
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