This is one of the best arguments against software patents that I have
heard. Interestingly enough the article does not even mention software
directly.

<quote>
In the second decade of the twentieth century, it was almost
impossible to build an airplane in the United States. That was the
result of a chaotic legal battle among the dozens of
companies—including one owned by Orville Wright—that held patents on
the various components that made a plane go. No one could manufacture
aircraft without fear of being hauled into court.
</quote>

It is also a superb article for pointing out more generally why
property rights must be  defined then bounded.

BobLQ


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Daniel H Wolf <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Mon, Aug 11, 2008 at 12:36 AM
Subject: The Permission Problem: Underuse and waste b/c of patents/copyright
To: undisclosed-recipients


A very cogent note on the unprofitable downside of overextension of
patents and copyrights.
Dan

http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2008/08/11/080811ta_talk_surowiecki?yrail

The New Yorker.com
The Financial Page

The Permission Problem
by James Surowiecki
August 11, 2008

In the second decade of the twentieth century, it was almost
impossible to build an airplane in the United States. That was the
result of a chaotic legal battle among the dozens of
companies—including one owned by Orville Wright—that held patents on
the various components that made a plane go. No one could manufacture
aircraft without fear of being hauled into court. The First World War
got the industry started again, because Congress realized that
something needed to be done to get planes in the air. It created a
"patent pool," putting all the aircraft patents under the control of a
new association and letting manufacturers license them for a fee. Had
Congress not stepped in, we might still be flying around in blimps.

The situation that grounded the U.S. aircraft industry is an example
of what the Columbia law professor Michael Heller, in his new book,
"The Gridlock Economy," calls the "anticommons." We hear a lot about
the "tragedy of the commons": if a valuable asset (a grazing field,
say) is held in common, each individual will try to exploit as much of
it as possible. Villagers will send all their cows out to graze at the
same time, and soon the field will be useless. When there's no
ownership, the pursuit of individual self-interest can make everyone
worse off. But Heller shows that having too much ownership creates its
own problems. If too many people own individual parts of a valuable
asset, it's easy to end up with gridlock, since any one person can
simply veto the use of the asset.

The commons leads to overuse and destruction; the anticommons leads to
underuse and waste. In the cultural sphere, ever tighter restrictions
on copyright and fair use limit artists' abilities to sample and build
on older works of art. In biotechnology, the explosion of patenting
over the past twenty-five years—particularly efforts to patent things
like gene fragments—may be retarding drug development, by making it
hard to create a new drug without licensing myriad previous patents.
Even divided land ownership can have unforeseen consequences. Wind
power, for instance, could reliably supply up to twenty per cent of
America's energy needs—but only if new transmission lines were built,
allowing the efficient movement of power from the places where it's
generated to the places where it's consumed. Don't count on that
happening anytime soon. Most of the land that the grid would pass
through is owned by individuals, and nobody wants power lines running
through his back yard.

The point isn't that private property is a bad thing, or that the
state should be able to run roughshod over the rights of individual
owners. Property rights (including patents) are essential to economic
growth, providing incentives to innovate and invest. But property
rights need to be limited to be effective. The more we divide common
resources like science and culture into small, fenced-off lots, Heller
shows, the more difficult we make it for people to do business and to
build something new. Innovation, investment, and growth end up being
stifled.

Opportunities forgone aren't always easy to see. The effects of
overuse are generally unmistakable—you can't miss the empty nets of
fishing boats working overfished oceans, or the scrub that covers an
overgrazed field. But the effects of underuse created by too much
ownership are often invisible. They're mainly things that don't
happen: inventions that don't get made, useful drugs that never get to
market.

In theory, one should be able to break a gridlock by striking a deal
that would leave all sides better off. Sometimes that happens. Just
the other week, for instance, Nokia and Qualcomm settled a
three-year-long patent battle, which could accelerate the spread of
third-generation cell-phone technology here and in Europe. In a less
contentious fashion, products like the DVD player quickly became
mainstream and affordable because many companies worked together to
form patent pools. Even the fact that there's music on the radio is
the result of songwriters' collectively allowing two main groups,
ASCAP and BMI, to handle the licensing of their songs to radio
stations.

One reason deals founder is that there are simply too many interested
parties. If, in order to create a new drug, you have to strike
bargains with thirty or forty other companies, it's easy to decide
that the price is too high. But often things go awry because owners
won't make a deal at a reasonable price, as with America's nascent
aircraft industry. Or take a problem that bedevils the oil-and-gas
industry. When different companies own adjacent patches of an oil
field, each will be tempted not only to drill its own patch but also
to try to suck out the resources of its neighbor's patch. For
geological reasons, overdrilling actually reduces the total amount of
oil you can get out of the field—all sides end up worse off. An
obvious solution is to have one company do the drilling and share the
revenues with the other players. But, as the economics professor Gary
Libecap has shown in a historical analysis, such agreements are often
reached only belatedly, if ever.

Recent experimental work by the psychologist Sven Vanneste and the
legal scholar Ben Depoorter helps explain why. When something you own
is necessary to the success of a venture, even if its contribution is
small, you'll tend to ask for an amount close to the full value of the
venture. And since everyone in your position also thinks he deserves a
huge sum, the venture quickly becomes unviable. So the next time we
start handing out new ownership rights—whether via patents or
copyright or privatization schemes—we'd better try to weigh all the
good things that won't happen as a result. Otherwise, we won't know
what we've been missing. ♦

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