On 7/21/07 2:21 AM, "Avi Kivity" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Anthony Liguori wrote: >> James Morris wrote: >> >>> On Fri, 20 Jul 2007, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> It could be - if your put the policy at the control API layer instead of >>>> in QEMU itself. >>>> >>>> >>> Then you can bypass MAC security by invoking qemu directly. >>> >>> >> >> You can bypass MAC security by writing your own binary that uses the KVM >> kernel interfaces. >> >> > > I guess modifying qemu makes sense if the modification gives you *more* > permissions. > > i.e. you start out just with the ability to access the disk image, and > then you transition to a new domain that allows you to access some network. > > > Is that what is intended here? The intent here is to provide some mechanism for a policy-driven transition to occur when loading a virtual disk. So, an administrator would write policy for say, a topsecret_vm_t domain, in which the top secret VM can run. All access requests from this VM would have a source type of topsecret_vm_t on the host machine. The virtual disk, labeled perhaps as topsecret_disk_t, would need to be authorized in policy to be an entrypoint into the topsecret_vm_t domain. This patch proposes a mechanism that allows us to provide policy driven controls both over which files can be used as a disk image, and to which domain a qemu process will transition after loading the disk image. Originally, I thought qemu was the proper place for this type of an enforcement hook, but libvirt may be more appropriate because qemu could be launched with a different security context if loading a virtual disk, rather than having qemu set up the security context of the VM. Thoughts? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- This SF.net email is sponsored by: Microsoft Defy all challenges. Microsoft(R) Visual Studio 2005. http://clk.atdmt.com/MRT/go/vse0120000070mrt/direct/01/ _______________________________________________ kvm-devel mailing list kvm-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/kvm-devel
