EAST TIMOR REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN 1999: FIRST INTERIM REPORT TO ACTU EXECUTIVE
This is a brief, first interim report of my involvement in the ACTU's
implementation of its resolution in support of the pro-independence
campaign in the East Timor referendum. It is understood that Rob Durbridge
has also prepared a report covering his time in Dili, 8-16 August. The
matters that he will have covered will not be canvassed comprehensively in
this report.
In reading this report it should be borne in mind that (1) the situation
here is very fluid, uncertain, volatile and unclear and that (2) what
follows will not be explicit on a number of matters. While the CNRT
(pro-independence) coalition has taken the ACTU into its confidence in a
remarkable way, it is important that anything that may possibly fall into
inappropriate hands does not compromise that trust. As I am constantly
reminded, this is a war and it is not over yet.
1. CNRT campaign strategy
The CNRT campaign is heavily influenced by considerations of security and
by the need to avoid confrontation with the pro-integration forces and more
particularly the militia. Thus the campaign has been very low-key and has
emphasised ceremonies (especially flag-raising) conducted in a calm,
reverent and positive atmosphere. The widely-reported opening of the CNRT
campaign, here in Dili on 15 August, was typical of the approach adopted.
The overwhelming sense of joy and expectation attached to such events,
however, is also central to them: there is much dancing, singing and
happiness as the people of all ages anticipate a successful outcome to the
referendum. As one woman said to me, "When I hear the official
announcement that we have won the ballot and that we will become
independent, I will dance in the streets and cry until I have no tears=
left".
Apart from these street-party events, however, the CNRT strategy has
concentrated on a house-to-house campaign designed to ensure that all
voters understand the voting process and know what to do once thay enter
the polling booth. It is my understanding that, under the agreed rules,
voters may not be accompanied into the booth. This is a problem given
that, by various estimates, up to 80% of adult East Timorese are
illiterate. Thus an education campaign has been mounted, to make paople
familiar with the coloured picture symbols used on the ballot paper. Since
these centre upon ther image of a map of East Timor and the respective
flags of the two sides (Indonesian and CNRT), there are problems in
ensuring that voters understand which symbol to choose. While this might
be difficult to understand for Australians, it must be emphasised that many
people here in East Timor are completely unfamiliar with the idea of
pictorial images on paper, including flag pictures and especially maps.
The recognition of such symbols is actually an acquired skill, cimmonplace
in our culture but foreign to an oral/aural culture where books and paper
are rare.
A further aspect of this part of the campaign involves teaching people to
use a pencil either to make a mark in the intended place on the paper, or,
as is permitted, to pierce the paper with the pencil on or near the chosen
symbol. There are fears that this will not be straightforward for many
voters. Many people, furthermore, still fear that the ballot will not be
secret and thus they have to be encouraged to attend the polling booth in
the first instance.
A strict policy of non-confrontation is in force on the pro-independence
side. In general terms this has been abided by, although there are signs
that it may not hold. Supporters are becoming tired of the harassment and
intimidation on the part of the militias. (This is further discussed=
below.)
However, it has been decided to hold a large pro-independence rally on 25
August. This will take the form of a show of force in the streets, similar
in some ways to the rallies of the intergrationists where large numbers of
people ride in convoy in vehicles all around the town. Events of this sort
are likely to lead to reprisals on the part of the militias.
2. Falintil 25th anniversary celebrations
Campaigning has been hindered by the fact that the 25th anniversary of the
Fretilin military wing, Falintil, fell on the weekend of 21-22 August.
Many thousands of people converged on four locations in Falintil-held areas
in the mountains, leaving only a skeleton staff in town. The party and
show of strength continued for four days. Thus not only were numbers
depleted at campaign headquarters, but a vacuum was created which allowed
the militias to show their own strength by harassing and attacking CNRT
offices and individual people in several centres, including Dili.
The Falintil celebrations, however, were a great success in terms of the
prominence and interest that they generated in the foreign and Indonesian
media. This was a strategic decision by CNRT, which wanted to show that
reports that Falintil had become a tiny, pathetic, ragged band of fanatics,
hiding in the jungle, were entirely wrong. In this respect the move was
successful.
3. ACTU involvement
The ACTU and its affiliates have provided material and financial support of
various kinds to the campaign. This has included cash for specific and
non-specific purposes, gifts of computer equipment, a fax, paper and a
machine to make badges and so on. (It should be noted in passing that the
badges are very successful. They depict the CNRT flag and thus are
important means of gaining exposure for this emblem.)
In addition, individual unions and also APHEDA have been represented here
recently and Rob Durbridge (AEU) was in Dili for a week just prior to my
arrival, paving the way for my own involvement. His work in establishing
and consolidating contacts has proved invaluable.
As ACTU representative in the CNRT campaign currently on the ground in
Dili, I have attempted to assist in whatever way I can. In many respects
people here are far too busy to devote time to developing a clear role for
me, and in briefing me fully on events, strategies and so on. The public
presence of the ACTU in the campaign, by means of my physical presence in
the office and at formal occasions, is important in itself. In addition I
am able to use my Indonesian/English language and communication skills in a
number of ways including:
=B7 The drafting of correspondence to international organisations and foreig=
n
representatives such as the ANC;
=B7 Translation of materials from Indonesian for distribution to the foreign
media and others;
=B7 Informal training in basic computer skills; and
=B7 Translation of materials from English to Indonesian.
In the last regard this has included the translation of a letter of
solidarity drafted by Rob Durbridge on behalf of the ACTU, which is
appearing in the CNRT campaign newspaper, Vox Populi. This publication,
especially produced for the campaign, is also being funded by the ACTU. It
has proved very popular.=20
When time permits I am working on a translation of the Amnesty
International Australia report, just released, on the situation of women in
East Timor. This report has elicited much interest among women activists
and women's groups, who are awaiting eagerly a version that they can read
for themselves.
5. Unionism in East Timor
Rob Durbridge's report will have included reference to the problems faced
by the fledgling trade union movement in East Timor. In a sense this area
has not been a priority for the activists here, and this is understandable.
Like many other issues, the issue of workers' rights has been set aside
until after independence is won.
It appears, however, that there may be little understanding among Fretilin
activists of the role and purpose of unions. While SBSI has recognised the
need to establish the nucleus of a union movement here, Fretilin seems
still to be a long way from this point. It is not certain that a single
union confederation will emerge, at least in the short term. I will
attempt to hold a meeting with Jacob belo from SBSI before I leave. A
meeting promised by Fretilin people to discuss future union organisation,
however, was cancelled due to campaign priorities and it is unlikely that
this will take place.
6. The role of NGOs in a newly independent East Timor
There is some concern among those activists who have spent time abroad that
the transition from the independence struggle to government will be a
difficult and painful one for non-government organisations which have been
closely allied to Fretilin over the last twenty or more years. Some people
understand =96 in part from looking at countries such as South Africa =96 th=
at
NGOs will need to reposition themselves vis a vis government and that they
are unprepared for this. This issue is closely related, of course, to the
problems in achieving any focus in the current situation on establishing a
union movement which is separate from, and has interests objectively
different to, those of government. Some people are looking to the ACTU to
play a role in assisting NGOs, especially but not only unions, in this
regard. Women's groups were singled out for special mention.
7. Training and education needs
Also recognised are the pressing needs for training and education. It is
widely recognised that in many respects people are unprepared for the new
roles that they will be obliged to assume. Many activists, due to their
involvement in the armed guerrilla struggle, have received little formal
education. Expertise is lacking in many areas. The flight of Indonesian
teachers, health workers and those form other areas of the public service
has already depleted schools, hospitals and clinics to a serious extent.
Most government offices are not in reality operating at all and absenteeism
is rife. The needs as identified to me include:
=B7 Literacy and numeracy training;
=B7 Teahcer training and professional development;
=B7 Assistance in the development of new school curriculum and materials in
Tetum and Portuguese, the new national languages;
=B7 English language skills;
=B7 Economics, business and accounting knowledge and skills;
=B7 Training of health professionals.
In addition, as mentioned, there is little knowledge of how to organise
workers in a union context and in how to establish and structure a viable
union movement.
2. The current security situation and prospects for the ballot
The security situation in East Timor is deteroriating further. It has
become unsafe to go out at night at all and there is much fear of the
militias on the part of the ordinary eople and activists alike. The
campaign of intimidation has been successful. There is gratuitous shooting
every night, designed simply to frighten people, as well as actual
shootings in regional towns and villages. UNAMET, the offices of
international agencies and also CNRT offices have been attacked. There
have been at leat two threats in the past week of . on the new CNRT office,
where I work, and the office of the Fretilin political wing, FPI, received
a bullet through the window on 18 August. On the first occasion when the
CNRT head office was threatened with attack, only one police officer was
despatched to assist. On the second, however, on Friday, 20 August, about
15 police appeared to guard the building. This may have been the reason
that the attack did not take place.
People are also being systematically threatened in their homes at night =96
threats that the militias will be back later to kill them or to burn down
their houses, for instance. This constitutes a deliberate strategy of
sleep-deprivation harassment and is likely to lead to irrational behaviour
on the part of the victims, who are invariably pro-independence activists.
The militias are also ripping down pro-independence posters and
distributing computer-generated images apparently of President Xanana (as
he is already known) disporting himself with two naked women. The Tetum
message on this leaflet is to the effect that, while the gullible are
toiling away and giving their lives for him, Xanana is having a very good
time indeed under house arrest in Jakarta. To the computer-illiterate
people, these pictures are entirely convincing.
Of great concern is the fact that UNAMET was, until very recently,
apparently unaware of many of these events. Now, however, it seems that
the UN is taking a closer interest in what is actually reported by those on
the ground. Until last week, the UN was relying on formal meetings, held
every three days, at which the two parties to the ballot protocol agreement
were asked whether there had been any violations on the part of their
opposition. Invariably, they answered that there had not. Due to my
location politically (ie partisan rather than "neutral", as the observers
and the media are), and to the fact that I live and work amongst and with
CNRT leaders and supporters, I am possibly uniquely placed, for a
foreigner, to see how those on the independence side are faring under the
constant and often brutal onslaught of the militia, aided and abetted by
the army and the police. And at this point I am extremely disturbed.
Prospects for a peaceful ballot are grim. It is clear that the militias
have no intention of allowing the ballot to proceed fairly and that they
will use any tactics at their disposal. Every day they violate the
agreement which allocates alternate days to the two sides for public
campaigning. They also consistently breach the prohibition on parading in
the street in front of the offices of their opposition. Often they are
armed. CNRT, for its part, has consistently kept to its side of the=
bargain.
Death threats associated with the ballot process and its outcome will
likely mean that many people are discouraged from voting. There are fears
that people will be persuaded to hand over their voter registration papers
to thugs who will either destroy them, or else attempt to use them to cast
multiple votes. Whatever happens, these votes will be lost to the
pro-independence side. The few days leading up to the ballot, the day
itself (30 August) and the day of the announcement of the result (up to a
week later) are the most dangerous from a security point of view.
There are fears that the militias will blow up the bridge two kilometres on
the town side of the airport. The airport road goes through a militia-held
area and thus is very vulnerable. Those attempting to leave, both
foreigners and locals, are thus at serious risk. It is possible that the
airport road may be blocked or closed. The escape route planned by the
MEAA for Australian and foreign media, and some others, turns out not to be
feasible. However, I am informed that the Australian Consulate has
extracted a written undertaking from the Indonesian Government that it will
provide police and military for an armed convoy to make its way out of East
Timor across the border into West Timor, as far as Soe or even Kupang. =20
This is a viable, though dangerous, alternative should the airport be
inaccessible. All Australians shouldl be able to get out by this means,
but they will have to reach the gathering-points, in the centre of Dili, in
order to do so. Some MEAA members will be out in Liquica and Viqueque, and
possibly other very dangerous and remote spots, when it is likely that an
eruption of really serious violence will occur.
The people of East Timor, known now under its Tetum name of Timor Lorosa'e,
are looking forward with great anticipation and excitement to the prospect
of freedom. It is a great privilege to be among them at this wonderful
historical moment. But I am very fearful that their immediate future may
be even more grim than much of their past suffering. The brutality of the
Indonesian occupiers towards the East Timorese has taken its toll on the
atmosphere and moral framework in which decisions are made and matters
played out. Everyone has lost close relatives in the most horrific of
circumstances and everybody, including very small children, has witnessed
one way or another these acts of brutality. Lives are changed profoundly,
as are people's priorities and ways of seeing the world. It is thus not
unthinkable that many more lives could be lost over the next few months.
3. A peace-keeping force
It is my strong personal view that an international peace-keeping force is
needed in East Timor immediately, in the period leading up to the ballot
and until peace is assured and the militias disarmed after voting day, 30
August. This would mean at least several months. There is in my opinion
no prospect that Indonesia, by which I mean ABRI, will cease its campaign
of support for the militias and force them to keep to the rules.
Recommendations
It is recommended that:
1. In the light of the matters raised in sections 4-6 of this report, the
ACTU give serious consideration to the development (through APHEDA where
appropriate) of a program of ongoing financial, material, political and
other support to the new nation of Timor Lorosa'e, including its
Government, its emerging union movement and other non-government
organisations.
2. More immediately, the ACTU should plan to send a further delegation to
East Timor, as soon as possible consistent with the priorities of the new
government and other relevant organisations in East Timor, to discuss in
detail the means and extent that assistance can be provided on a long-term
basis.
3. That the ACTU immediatelyexpress to the Australian Government and the
Opposition the view that an international peace-keeping force should be
sent to East Timor as soon as possible, and before the ballot on 30 August.
Jane Nicholls
Dili, Timor Lorosa'e, 23/8/99
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