Hey guys,
I appreciate the importance and depth of this discussion. But I also wish to underscore that most of the people who are at risk are not using any tools whether they be CrytoCat, PGP, GChat or others for the simple reason that they either cannot figure them out, or don't have time to figure them out, or both. And I am talking about people at risk in many different nations.
No doubt the functional security of tools is an indispensable, essential concern. Ignoring any vulnerabilities is dangerous, indeed. But the usability of the same tools and making them accessible to non-technologists is just as big a concern, in my view. I know you guys think that many such users including Western journalists are simply lazy. But many, if not most of the available tools are simply not intuitive, or not as much as most technologists who already know how to use them seem to think.
How many people on this list have spent time asking non-technologists and other users who have tried, but have since given up even trying to use tools like PGP? Or have examined how new users interact with such tools? I have a great deal of respect for this community. But to be honest it seems to me that neither the technologists nor the donors have spent much time asking such questions.
If a novice user make a mistake in PGP, for example, it's over. Options are not intuitive if you don't already know them. And if you hit the wrong button, you can end up at a deadend with no guidance how to get back on track. Trust me. I know. And I am not trashing PGP. I know well and fully appreciate it's value and I have used it and continue to use it hostile environments. And I also know that users and only users can make crucial choices during use for their own security. I get that, too. But most digital security tools still do not do a good job of laying out, let alone explaining the options. And I say that with respect for the value of the tools and options themselves.
Cryptocat is one of the most user-friendly tools out there, and I think Nadim deserves credit for the effort. Of course, the vulnerabilities must be fixed before anyone should use it in a hostile environment. Although the level of vulnerability might also depend on the nature of the threat in any particular environment. But I also think we need to spend as much time making tools accessible as we do making them secure if we are going to reach the people who really need them. And right now few if any of these tools are having the reach that we all agree is needed. And that is an issue largely of usability.
I think with more constructive collaboration we would achieve both. We need to. Thanks.
Best, Frank
Frank Smyth
Executive Director
Global Journalist Security
Tel. + 1 202 244 0717
Cell + 1 202 352 1736
Twitter: @JournoSecurity
Website: www.journalistsecurity.net
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-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [liberationtech] What I've learned from Cryptocat
From: Moxie Marlinspike <mo...@thoughtcrime.org>
Date: Mon, August 06, 2012 10:29 pm
To: liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu
On 08/06/2012 06:59 PM, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
> Except that with your harm mitigation, you push many potential users
> back to plaintext, where they are guaranteed to be owned. What
> percentage of potential cryptocat users would the plugin version have to
> stop from using the tool for you to accept that there was a place for
> the non-plugin version?
Let's stop using the word "plaintext," because my understanding is that
none of the chat services we're speaking of transmit data in the clear.
As I see it, there are currently three possible vectors for attack with
"existing" web-based chat services:
1) SSL interception.
2) Server compromise.
3) Server operator.
The technology in CryptoCat v1 does not address any of these three
vectors, and all of them remain possible. My position is that it's
actually more susceptible to attack via #1 and #2 than existing
web-based chat solutions. I believe your position is that it improves
on vector #3 by virtue of being not-Facebook. (I'm curious how you
measure #3 in comparison to GChat.)
If we postulate that CryptoCat does improve vector #3 by virtue of being
not-Facebook, it isn't a result of the technology, but simply that we've
agreed Nadim has a better monitoring/interception track record than
Facebook. If that's something you think is valuable, it actually seems
like it'd potentially be better served by having someone like the EFF or
Riseup host a web-based and SSL-protected chat service, without brining
any additional cryptography confusion into the mix. A trust project,
not a cryptography project.
Unfortunately for me, I'd rather depend on cryptography than people.
But I believe that CryptoCat is actually well positioned to drive
changes in the ecosystem that will allow them to really improve on those
three vectors in time. I think it's difficult to experiment in public
with security tools, however, and that it's a sage decision to make a
secure solution available (CryptoCat v2) and work on reducing friction
while maintaining security from there.
- moxie
--
http://www.thoughtcrime.org
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