Hi! On Sun, Jul 14, 2013 at 10:25 AM, Caleb James DeLisle <calebdeli...@lavabit.com> wrote: > The most scary general attack on the idea is a node who drops 10% of the > packets sent through them. I don't know how to detect it statelessly and > they can do quite a bit of damage.
Exactly. You don't have to black hole everything, just enough to make the network behave badly. > Again though the physical reality of the network comes in to play. A "physical reality" in your case means the tunnels between nodes, not necessary the real-world physical distance? So you have tunnels between nodes and you assume that those tunnels are established based on some trust? And you route along the tunnels? I thought that you route along the Kademlia distance between keys of nodes. So if my key ID is closer to node B than to node C, I send packet to node B. And it does not matter how the tunnels are setup. It seems I misunderstood something then. This is then quite different than Kademlia. And from whitepaper: "The "address space distance" between any two given addresses is defined as the of the result of the two addresses XOR'd against one another, rotated 64 bits, then interpreted as a big endian integer." So where does this definition of distance take into the account that there is trust between two addresses but no trust between some other two addresses? Mitar -- http://mitar.tnode.com/ https://twitter.com/mitar_m -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
