On 25 July 2013 06:41, Ben Laurie <b...@links.org> wrote: > What helps here is perfect forward secrecy.
Only so long as the exact same web companies can _also_ justify not giving up the secrets on the backend. IANAL obviously, but as we saw in the compelled encryption keys for hard drives, the government chose the very intelligent tact of not demanding the key, but rather access to the decrypted content. If this was argued in court, and they made the same argument, ant the government won... well, it might make PFS useless too. (The company choosing to either not use PFS so they don't have to modify their SSL terminators, or making the modification and handing the premaster secret over). I, personally, would not feel confident in PFS keeping the government out of the SSL stream if I suspected the SSL keys were being handed over. > BTW, better alternative to Convergence: Certificate Transparency - > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962. Only in an architectural sense - in a year we might have Chrome enforcing CT for specific CAs, and in a couple of years to ten years, we might have CT applying to all CAs in a trust store*. You can use Convergence today. -tom * This is obviously wild speculation about plans from someone who has no idea what Chrome is planning, talking to someone who does, but probably can't talk about it publicly yet. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
