Hi Bastien, We add a forward upfront payment of 1 msat (fixed) that is paid > unconditionally when offering an HTLC. > We add a backwards upfront payment of `hold_fees` that is paid when > receiving an HTLC, but refunded > if the HTLC is settled before the `hold_grace_period` ends (see footnotes > about this). >
It is interesting that the forward and backward payments are relatively independent of each other. In particular the forward anti-spam payment could quite easily be implemented to help protect the network. As you said, just transfer that fixed fee for every `update_add_htlc` message from the offerer to the receiver. I am wondering though what the values for the fwd and bwd fees should be. I agree with ZmnSCPxj that 1 msat for the fwd is probably not going to be enough. Maybe a way to approach it is this: suppose routing nodes are able to make 5% per year on their committed capital. An aggressive routing node could be willing to spend up to that amount to take down a competitor. Suppose the network consists only of 1 BTC, 483 slot channels. What should the fwd and bwd fees be so that even an attacked routing node will still earn that 5% (not through forwarding fees, but through hold fees) in both the controlled and the uncontrolled spam scenario? - Joost
_______________________________________________ Lightning-dev mailing list Lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev