Good morning t-bast,
> > And in this case C earns.
>
> > Can C delay the refund to D to after the grace period even if D settled the
> > HTLC quickly?
>
> Yes C earns, but D has misbehaved. As a final recipient, D isn't dependent on
> anyone downstream.
> An honest D should settle the HTLC before the `grace_period` ends. If D
> chooses to hold the HTLC
> for a while, then it's fair that he pays C for this.
Okay, now let us consider the case where the supposedly-delaying party is not
the final destination.
So, suppose D indicates to C that it should fail the HTLC.
In this case, C cannot immediately propagate the `update_fail_htlc` upstream,
since the latest commitment transaction for the C<->D channel still contains
the HTLC.
In addition, our state machine is hand-over-hand, i.e. there is a small window
where there are two valid commitment transactions.
What happens is we sign the next commitment transaction and *then* revoke the
previous one.
So I think C can only safely propagate its own upstream `update_fail_htlc` once
it receives the `revoke_and_ack` from D.
So the time measured for the grace period between C and D should be from C
sending `update_add_htlc` to C receiving `revoke_and_ack` from D, in case the
HTLC fails.
This is the time period that D is allowed to consume, and if it exceeds the
grace period, it is penalized.
(In this situation, it is immaterial if D is the destination: C cannot know
this fact.)
So let us diagram this better:
C D
|----update_add_htlc--->| ---
|---commitment_signed-->| ^
|<----revoke_and_ack----| |
|<--commitment_signed---| |
|-----revoke_and_ack--->| |
| | grace period
|<--update_fail_htlc----| |
|<--commitment_signed---| |
|-----revoke_and_ack--->| |
|---commitment_signed-->| v <--- grief point!
|<----revoke_and_ack----| ---
(somebody *else* better make sure my understanding of the state machine is
correct!)
C can trivially grief D here, making it look like D is delaying, by delaying
its own `commitment_signed` containing the *removal* of the HTLC.
D cannot send its own `revoke_and_ack` until it receives the signature for its
own next commitment, as if it did so, it would lose the ability to close the
channel unilaterally; it has to wait for C to send the `commitment_signed`.
Thus, it seems to me that C can grief D here.
The question is: does the above C-can-grief-D matter?
I think D does have a defense against C griefing in the above case:
* If the time between D->`update_fail_htlc`->C and the corresponding
C->`commitment_signed`->D becomes too long:
* D drops the channel onchain.
* The dropped commitment tx still contains the HTLC, since it is the
"previous" commitment that D happens to hold that has not yet had the
`update_fail_htlc` committed.
If D performs the above, then C is forced to wait *even longer* (it has to wait
out the HTLC timelock) before it can safely propagate the `update_fail_htlc`: D
could be fooling with it and actually knows the preimage and claim it onchain,
so C for its own safety *must* wait out the onchain timelock.
Does that make sense?
Does it sensibly protect against this griefing?
Is it too much of a punishment and could potentially hurt D more than it hurts
C if C is a heavily-connected node that will not miss the channel while D has
fewer channels and opened the C<->D channel in the first place?
--
For success case `update_fulfill_htlc`, I believe C can immediately propagate
this back to its upstream since it can now.
Thus, in that case, we can stop the timer at the `update_fulfill_htlc`.
So at least for the *end point* of the grace period, I think the end point
should be:
* If the HTLC failed:
* When both participants have sent `revoke_and_ack`.
* If the HTLC succeeded:
* When the downstream participant has sent `update_fulfill_htlc`.
For the *start point*, it seems the C->`commitment_signed`->D containing the
HTLC would work as the start point.
In particular, it seems to me that C can also deliberately defer its own
C->`revoke_and_ack`->D:
C D
|----update_add_htlc--->|
|---commitment_signed-->| ---
|<----revoke_and_ack----| ^
|<--commitment_signed---| |
|-----revoke_and_ack--->| | <--- grief point!
| | grace period
|<--update_fail_htlc----| |
|<--commitment_signed---| |
|-----revoke_and_ack--->| |
|---commitment_signed-->| v
|<----revoke_and_ack----| ---
(If D deliberately delays, then it is penalized, so we should consider the case
where C attempts to trigger the reverse case).
D cannot safely fulfill the HTLC until after the previous commitment
transactions of *both* sides have been revoked ("irrevocably committed" state).
So D can use the same defense, I think: if C is taking too long to send the
`revoke_and_ack` pointed at above, it drops the channel onchain with the HTLC
instantiated (which is why the *start time* has to be the
C->`commitment_signed`->D that contains the new HTLC).
Thus the D grace period has two smaller grace periods that D imposes on C,
using the threat of channel drop to protect against the C-side griefing.
Sorry for dropping into details already but so far this is the only griefing
attack I can think of right now.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
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