On Do, 2014-07-17 at 05:18 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> SYNOPSIS
> #include <linux/random.h>
>
> int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);
Cool, I think the interface is sane.
Btw. couldn't libressl etc. fall back to binary_sysctl
kernel.random.uuid and seed with that as a last resort? We have it
available for few more years.
> +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
> + unsigned int, flags)
> +{
> + int r;
> +
> + if (count > 256)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
Why this "arbitrary" limitation? Couldn't we just check for > SSIZE_MAX
or to be more conservative to INT_MAX?
> + if (flags & GRND_RANDOM) {
> + return _random_read(!(flags & GRND_BLOCK), buf, count);
> + }
> + if (flags & GRND_BLOCK) {
> + r = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&urandom_initialized);
> + if (r)
> + return r;
> + } else if (!completion_done(&urandom_initialized))
> + return -EAGAIN;
> + return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
> +}
> +
Great, thanks Ted,
Hannes
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