On Do, 2014-07-17 at 08:52 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 12:57:07PM +0200, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote: > > > > Btw. couldn't libressl etc. fall back to binary_sysctl > > kernel.random.uuid and seed with that as a last resort? We have it > > available for few more years. > > Yes, they could. But trying to avoid more uses of binary_sysctl seems > to be a good thing, I think. The other thing is that is that this > interface provides is the ability to block until the entropy pool is > initialized, which isn't a big deal for x86 systems, but might be > useful as a gentle forcing function to force ARM systems to figure out > good ways of making sure the entropy pools are initialized (i.e., by > actually providing !@#!@ cycle counter) without breaking userspace > compatibility --- since this is a new interface.
I am not questioning this new interface - I like it - just wanted to mention there is already a safe fallback for LibreSSL in the way they already seem to do it in OpenBSD (via sysctl). > > > > + if (count > 256) > > > + return -EINVAL; > > > + > > > > Why this "arbitrary" limitation? Couldn't we just check for > SSIZE_MAX > > or to be more conservative to INT_MAX? > > I'm not wedded to this limitation. OpenBSD's getentropy(2) has an > architected arbitrary limit of 128 bytes. I haven't made a final > decision if the right answer is to hard code some value, or make this > limit be configurable, or remote the limit entirely (which in practice > would be SSIZE_MAX or INT_MAX). > > The main argument I can see for putting in a limit is to encourage the > "proper" use of the interface. In practice, anything larger than 128 > probably means the interface is getting misused, either due to a bug > or some other kind of oversight. > > For example, when I started instrumenting /dev/urandom, I caught > Google Chrome pulling 4k out of /dev/urandom --- twice --- at startup > time. It turns out it was the fault of the NSS library, which was > using fopen() to access /dev/urandom. (Sigh.) In the end people would just recall getentropy in a loop and fetch 256 bytes each time. I don't think the artificial limit does make any sense. I agree that this allows a potential misuse of the interface, but doesn't a warning in dmesg suffice? It also makes it easier to port applications from open("/dev/*random"), read(...) to getentropy() by reusing the same limits. I would vote for warning (at about 256 bytes) + no limit. Thanks, Hannes -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html