On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 04:21:21PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Provide support so that kexec can be used to boot a kernel when SME is
> enabled.
>
> Support is needed to allocate pages for kexec without encryption. This
> is needed in order to be able to reboot in the kernel in the same manner
> as originally booted.
>
> Additionally, when shutting down all of the CPUs we need to be sure to
> flush the caches and then halt. This is needed when booting from a state
> where SME was not active into a state where SME is active (or vice-versa).
> Without these steps, it is possible for cache lines to exist for the same
> physical location but tagged both with and without the encryption bit. This
> can cause random memory corruption when caches are flushed depending on
> which cacheline is written last.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lenda...@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/init.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h | 5 +++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h | 8 ++++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 35
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c | 11 +++++++----
> include/linux/kexec.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
> kernel/kexec_core.c | 7 +++++++
> 9 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
...
> @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image,
> pgd_t *pgd)
> set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
> }
> pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
> - set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC));
> + set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC));
> return 0;
> err:
> free_transition_pgtable(image);
> @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned
> long start_pgtable)
> .alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page,
> .context = image,
> .pmd_flag = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC,
> + .kernpg_flag = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC,
> };
> unsigned long mstart, mend;
> pgd_t *level4p;
> @@ -597,3 +598,35 @@ void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
> {
> kexec_mark_crashkres(false);
> }
> +
> +int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (sme_active()) {
if (!sme_active())
return 0;
/*
* If SME...
> + /*
> + * If SME is active we need to be sure that kexec pages are
> + * not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
> + * pages won't be accessed encrypted (initially).
> + */
> + ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + if (gfp & __GFP_ZERO)
> + memset(vaddr, 0, pages * PAGE_SIZE);
This function is called after alloc_pages() which already zeroes memory
when __GFP_ZERO is supplied.
If you need to clear the memory *after* set_memory_encrypted() happens,
then you should probably mask out __GFP_ZERO before the alloc_pages()
call so as not to do it twice.
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages)
> +{
> + if (sme_active()) {
> + /*
> + * If SME is active we need to reset the pages back to being
> + * an encrypted mapping before freeing them.
> + */
> + set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
> + }
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> index 0bb8842..f4e5de6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
> #include <linux/cpuidle.h>
> #include <trace/events/power.h>
> #include <linux/hw_breakpoint.h>
> +#include <linux/kexec.h>
> #include <asm/cpu.h>
> #include <asm/apic.h>
> #include <asm/syscalls.h>
> @@ -355,8 +356,25 @@ bool xen_set_default_idle(void)
> return ret;
> }
> #endif
> +
> void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)
> {
> + bool do_wbinvd_halt = false;
> +
> + if (kexec_in_progress && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME)) {
> + /*
> + * If we are performing a kexec and the processor supports
> + * SME then we need to clear out cache information before
> + * halting. With kexec, going from SME inactive to SME active
> + * requires clearing cache entries so that addresses without
> + * the encryption bit set don't corrupt the same physical
> + * address that has the encryption bit set when caches are
> + * flushed. Perform a wbinvd followed by a halt to achieve
> + * this.
> + */
> + do_wbinvd_halt = true;
> + }
> +
> local_irq_disable();
> /*
> * Remove this CPU:
> @@ -365,8 +383,12 @@ void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)
> disable_local_APIC();
> mcheck_cpu_clear(this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info));
>
> - for (;;)
> - halt();
> + for (;;) {
> + if (do_wbinvd_halt)
> + native_wbinvd_halt();
No need for that native_wbinvd_halt() thing:
for (;;) {
if (do_wbinvd)
wbinvd();
halt();
}
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
> index 04210a2..2c9fd3e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static void ident_pmd_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info,
> pmd_t *pmd_page,
> static int ident_pud_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud_page,
> unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
> {
> + unsigned long kernpg_flag = info->kernpg_flag ? : _KERNPG_TABLE;
You're already supplying a x86_mapping_info and thus you can init
kernpg_flag to default _KERNPG_TABLE and override it in the SME+kexec
case, as you already do. And this way you can simply do:
set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | info->kernpg_flag));
here and in the other pagetable functions I've snipped below, and save
yourself some lines.
...
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
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