On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 03:42:14PM +0100, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 3:31 PM, Neil Horman <nhor...@tuxdriver.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 03:02:38PM +0100, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> >> Hello,
> >>
> >> I've git the following error report while running syzkaller fuzzer:
> >>
> >> ==================================================================
> >> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy+0x1d/0x40 at addr ffff88006c6361e8
> >> Read of size 28 by task syz-executor/12551
> >> =============================================================================
> >> BUG kmalloc-16 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
> >> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>
> >> INFO: Allocated in sctp_setsockopt_bindx+0xd2/0x3e0 age=12 cpu=2 pid=12551
> >> [< inline >] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:468
> >> [< none >] sctp_setsockopt_bindx+0xd2/0x3e0 net/sctp/socket.c:975
> >> [< none >] sctp_setsockopt+0x1493/0x3630 net/sctp/socket.c:3711
> >> [< none >] sock_common_setsockopt+0x97/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2620
> >> [< inline >] SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1752
> >> [< none >] SyS_setsockopt+0x15b/0x250 net/socket.c:1731
> >> [< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
> >> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
> >>
> >> INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001b18d80 objects=16 used=4 fp=0xffff88006c6376e0
> >> flags=0x5fffc0000004080
> >> INFO: Object 0xffff88006c6361e8 @offset=488 fp=0x0000000000000002
> >> Bytes b4 ffff88006c6361d8: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2f 98 34 88 ff ff
> >> ff ff ......../.4.....
> >> Object ffff88006c6361e8: 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 ab 07 7f 00 00
> >> 01 ................
> >> CPU: 2 PID: 12551 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.5.0-rc1+
> >> #278
> >> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs
> >> 01/01/2011
> >> 00000000ffffffff ffff880036397928 ffffffff8299a02d ffff88003e807900
> >> ffff88006c6361e8 ffff88006c636000 ffff880036397958 ffffffff81752814
> >> ffff88003e807900 ffffea0001b18d80 ffff88006c6361e8 ffff88006c6361e8
> >>
> >> Call Trace:
> >> [<ffffffff8175ad54>] __asan_loadN+0x124/0x1a0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:512
> >> [<ffffffff8175b2dd>] memcpy+0x1d/0x40 mm/kasan/kasan.c:297
> >> [<ffffffff85dcb249>] sctp_add_bind_addr+0xa9/0x270
> >> net/sctp/bind_addr.c:162
> >> [<ffffffff85dcfd66>] sctp_do_bind+0x336/0x580 net/sctp/socket.c:389
> >> [<ffffffff85dd16ec>] sctp_bindx_add+0xac/0x1a0 net/sctp/socket.c:471
> >> [<ffffffff85dd5cc8>] sctp_setsockopt_bindx+0x2f8/0x3e0
> >> net/sctp/socket.c:1010
> >> [<ffffffff85dde283>] sctp_setsockopt+0x1493/0x3630 net/sctp/socket.c:3711
> >> [<ffffffff851f5ae7>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x97/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2620
> >> [< inline >] SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1752
> >> [<ffffffff851f2c3b>] SyS_setsockopt+0x15b/0x250 net/socket.c:1731
> >> [<ffffffff863595f6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
> >> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
> >>
> >> Memory state around the buggy address:
> >> ffff88006c636080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> >> ffff88006c636100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> >> >ffff88006c636180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc
> >> ^
> >> ffff88006c636200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> >> ffff88006c636280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> >> ==================================================================
> >>
> >>
> >> sctp_setsockopt_bindx verifies that the user-passed address has valid
> >> len for the specified family, but then sctp_add_bind_addr copies whole
> >> sctp_addr from there. This causes heap out-of-bounds access and can
> >> crash kernel. Not sure if it is possible to copy out the trailing
> >> garbage to user-space later.
> >>
> >
> > It does more than that though. sctp_setsockopt_bindx checks the following:
> > 1) That passed addr_size is greater than zero
> > 2) that the entire range of memory between addrs and addrs+addr_size is
> > readable
> > 3) That at least one address structure worth of data is available (implicit
> > in
> > the while (walk_size < addr_size) loop).
> >
> > Could one of the sockaddr_len fields in one of the addresses have been
> > mangled
> > so that it appeared shorter in the the while loop from (3), so that a copy
> > of
> > sizeof(sctp_addr in sctp_add_bind_addr overrun the allocated memory?
>
> I may be missing something, but what I see is:
>
> 1. we check that there is at least family:
> if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrs_size) {
>
> 2. get family descriptor:
> af = sctp_get_af_specific(sa_addr->sa_family);
>
> 3. check that the address size is enough to hold the declared family:
> if (!af || (walk_size + af->sockaddr_len) > addrs_size) {
>
> 4. then we do sctp_add_bind_addr, which copies whole sctp_addr from addr:
>
> int sctp_add_bind_addr(struct sctp_bind_addr *bp, union sctp_addr *new,
> ...
> memcpy(&addr->a, new, sizeof(*new));
>
> Now imagine that the addr is ipv4 (16 or so bytes, that's what we
> checked) and we copy 28 bytes (ipv6) from addr.
Yes, that's pretty much it I think. That memcpy should be limited to
af->sockaddr_len, it's just that af is not readily available in that
function.
Marcelo
