Commit-ID:  c876eeab6432687846d4cd5fe1e43dbc348de134
Gitweb:     http://git.kernel.org/tip/c876eeab6432687846d4cd5fe1e43dbc348de134
Author:     Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Tue, 3 May 2016 10:31:49 -0700
Committer:  Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CommitDate: Wed, 4 May 2016 08:34:13 +0200

signals/sigaltstack: If SS_AUTODISARM, bypass on_sig_stack()

If a signal stack is set up with SS_AUTODISARM, then the kernel
inherently avoids incorrectly resetting the signal stack if signals
recurse: the signal stack will be reset on the first signal
delivery.  This means that we don't need check the stack pointer
when delivering signals if SS_AUTODISARM is set.

This will make segmented x86 programs more robust: currently there's
a hole that could be triggered if ESP/RSP appears to point to the
signal stack but actually doesn't due to a nonzero SS base.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>
Cc: Amanieu d'Antras <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Triplett <[email protected]>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Cc: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc: Stas Sergeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: 
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c46bee4654ca9e68c498462fd11746e2bd0d98c8.1462296606.git.l...@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
---
 include/linux/sched.h | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 2950c5c..77fd49f 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -2576,6 +2576,18 @@ static inline int kill_cad_pid(int sig, int priv)
  */
 static inline int on_sig_stack(unsigned long sp)
 {
+       /*
+        * If the signal stack is SS_AUTODISARM then, by construction, we
+        * can't be on the signal stack unless user code deliberately set
+        * SS_AUTODISARM when we were already on it.
+        *
+        * This improves reliability: if user state gets corrupted such that
+        * the stack pointer points very close to the end of the signal stack,
+        * then this check will enable the signal to be handled anyway.
+        */
+       if (current->sas_ss_flags & SS_AUTODISARM)
+               return 0;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
        return sp >= current->sas_ss_sp &&
                sp - current->sas_ss_sp < current->sas_ss_size;

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