Root in a user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a
namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
host.
This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a
vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct
vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (i.e. the uid_t in
init_user_ns) of the root id (uid 0 in a namespace) in whose namespaces
the file capabilities may take effect.
When a task in a user ns (which is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP toward
that user_ns) asks to write v2 security.capability, the kernel will
transparently rewrite the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid.
Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as
its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns,
will run the file with capabilities.
If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a
uid (valid within its own user namespace, over which it has CAP_SETFCAP)
for the xattr. The kernel will translate that to the absolute uid, and
write that to disk. After this, a task in the writer's namespace will
not be able to use those capabilities, but a task in a namespace where
the given uid is root will.
Only a single security.capability xattr may be written. A task may
overwrite the existing one so long as it was written by a user mapped
into his own user_ns over which he has CAP_SETFCAP.
This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and
allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving
the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent
namespace.
Changelog:
Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite()
Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns
---
fs/xattr.c | 27 +++-
include/linux/capability.h | 5 +-
include/linux/security.h | 2 +
include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 22 ++-
security/commoncap.c | 335 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 366 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 2d13b4e..e9e70f1 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -171,11 +171,27 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const
char *name,
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int error = -EAGAIN;
+ void *wvalue = NULL;
+ size_t wsize = 0;
int issec = !strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN);
- if (issec)
+ if (issec) {
inode->i_flags &= ~S_NOSEC;
+
+ /* if root in a non-init user_ns tries to set
+ * security.capability, write the virtualized
+ * xattr in its place */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "security.capability") &&
+ current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) {
+ cap_setxattr_make_nscap(dentry, value, size, &wvalue,
&wsize);
+ if (!wvalue)
+ return -EPERM;
+ value = wvalue;
+ size = wsize;
+ }
+ }
+
if (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) {
error = __vfs_setxattr(dentry, inode, name, value, size, flags);
if (!error) {
@@ -184,8 +200,10 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const
char *name,
size, flags);
}
} else {
- if (unlikely(is_bad_inode(inode)))
- return -EIO;
+ if (unlikely(is_bad_inode(inode))) {
+ error = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
}
if (error == -EAGAIN) {
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -200,10 +218,11 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const
char *name,
}
}
+out:
+ kfree(wvalue);
return error;
}
-
int
vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
size_t size, int flags)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index dbc21c7..edd5be1 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
-
+#include <linux/uidgid.h>
#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
@@ -246,4 +246,7 @@ extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct
user_namespace *ns,
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct
cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
+extern void cap_setxattr_make_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, const void *value,
+ size_t size, void **wvalue, size_t *wsize);
+
#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c2125e9..3127531 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const
char *name,
extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
+extern int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+ void **buffer, bool alloc);
extern int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
extern int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 49bc062..fd4f87d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -60,9 +60,13 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
#define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2
#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))
-#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
-#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2
-#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_3 0x03000000
+#define VFS_CAP_U32_3 2
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3 (sizeof(__le32)*(2 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_3))
+
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3
+#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_3
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_3
struct vfs_cap_data {
__le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */
@@ -72,6 +76,18 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
} data[VFS_CAP_U32];
};
+/*
+ * same as vfs_cap_data but with a rootid at the end
+ */
+struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
+ __le32 magic_etc;
+ struct {
+ __le32 permitted; /* Little endian */
+ __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */
+ } data[VFS_CAP_U32];
+ __le32 rootid;
+};
+
#ifndef __KERNEL__
/*
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 8df676f..1f189b2 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -332,6 +332,272 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
return error;
}
+static bool rootid_owns_currentns(kuid_t kroot)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *ns;
+
+ if (!uid_valid(kroot))
+ return false;
+
+ for (ns = current_user_ns(); ; ns = ns->parent) {
+ if (from_kuid(ns, kroot) == 0) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ if (ns == &init_user_ns)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static char *cap_convert_v2_v3(char *buf, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ char *ret;
+ struct vfs_ns_cap_data *v3;
+ struct vfs_cap_data *v2 = (struct vfs_cap_data *)buf;
+ kuid_t krootid;
+
+ krootid = make_kuid(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, 0);
+ if (!uid_valid(krootid)) {
+ ret = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = kmalloc(sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data), GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!ret) {
+ ret = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ v3 = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *)ret;
+
+ memcpy(&v3->data, &v2->data, sizeof(v2->data));
+ v3->magic_etc = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
+ if (v2->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+ v3->magic_etc |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
+ v3->rootid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, krootid);
+
+out:
+ kfree(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the
+ * xattr from the inode itself.
+ *
+ * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we
+ * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler.
+ *
+ * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called
+ * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values -
+ * so that's good.
+ */
+int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
+ bool alloc)
+{
+ int size, ret;
+ kuid_t kroot;
+ uid_t root, mappedroot;
+ char *tmpbuf = NULL;
+ struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
+
+ if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+ if (!dentry)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
+ ret = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, "security.capability",
+ &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+ if (ret == sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data) && fs_ns == &init_user_ns) {
+ /* If this is sizeof(vfs_cap_data) then we're ok with the
+ * on-disk value, so return that. */
+ if (alloc)
+ *buffer = tmpbuf;
+ else
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return ret;
+ } else if (ret == sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data)) {
+ tmpbuf = cap_convert_v2_v3(tmpbuf, inode);
+ if (!tmpbuf)
+ return -EPERM;
+ } else if (ret != size) {
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
+ root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
+ kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root);
+
+ /* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return
+ * this as a nscap. */
+ mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot);
+ if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1) {
+ if (alloc) {
+ *buffer = tmpbuf;
+ nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot);
+ } else
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return size;
+ }
+
+ if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) {
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ /* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */
+ size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data);
+ if (alloc) {
+ *buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (*buffer) {
+ struct vfs_cap_data *cap = *buffer;
+ __le32 nsmagic, magic;
+ magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
+ nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc);
+ if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+ magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
+ memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 *
VFS_CAP_U32);
+ cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Root can only overwite an existing security.capability xattr
+ * if it is privileged over the root listed in the xattr
+ * Note we've already checked for ns_capable(CAP_SETFCAP) in the
+ * !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid() call by the caller, so we do not
+ * check for that here.
+ */
+static bool refuse_fcap_overwrite(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ void *tmpbuf;
+ int ret;
+ uid_t root;
+ kuid_t kroot;
+ struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
+ __u32 magic_etc;
+ bool should_refuse;
+ struct user_namespace *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+
+ ret = cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, "capability", &tmpbuf, true);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return false;
+ if (ret == sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data) && fs_ns == &init_user_ns) {
+ /*
+ * host-root-installed capability, user-namespace-root may
+ * not overwrite this.
+ * TODO - if inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns we do
+ * in fact want to allow it.
+ */
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return true;
+ }
+ if (ret < sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data)) {
+ /* Corrupt fscap. Caller is privileged wrt inode, permit fixup
*/
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *)tmpbuf;
+
+ magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc);
+ if ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) != VFS_CAP_REVISION_3) {
+ /*
+ * This version is newer than we know about - i.e. from a newer
+ * kernel. Don't overwrite.
+ */
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return true;
+ }
+ if (ret != sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data)) {
+ /* Corrupt v4 fscap. Permit fixup */
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return false;
+ }
+ root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
+ kroot = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, root);
+ should_refuse = !kuid_has_mapping(current_user_ns(), kroot);
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return should_refuse;
+}
+
+static kuid_t rootid_from_xattr(const void *value, size_t size,
+ struct user_namespace *task_ns)
+{
+ const struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = value;
+ uid_t rootid = 0;
+
+ if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
+ rootid = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
+
+ return make_kuid(task_ns, rootid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use requested a write of security.capability but is in a non-init
+ * userns. So we construct and write a v4.
+ *
+ * If all is ok, wvalue has an allocated new value. Otherwise, wvalue
+ * is NULL.
+ */
+void cap_setxattr_make_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, const void *value, size_t
size,
+ void **wvalue, size_t *wsize)
+{
+ struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
+ const struct vfs_cap_data *cap = value;
+ __u32 magic, nsmagic;
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ struct user_namespace *task_ns = current_user_ns(),
+ *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+ kuid_t rootid;
+
+ if (!value)
+ return;
+ if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 && size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
+ return;
+ if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
+ return;
+
+ /* refuse if security.capability exists */
+ if (refuse_fcap_overwrite(inode))
+ return;
+
+ rootid = rootid_from_xattr(value, size, task_ns);
+ if (!uid_valid(rootid))
+ return;
+
+ *wsize = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
+ nscap = kmalloc(*wsize, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!nscap)
+ return;
+ nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(fs_ns, rootid));
+ nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
+ magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc);
+ if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+ nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
+ nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
+ memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
+
+ *wvalue = nscap;
+ return;
+}
+
/*
* Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
* to a file.
@@ -385,7 +651,10 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry,
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
__u32 magic_etc;
unsigned tocopy, i;
int size;
- struct vfs_cap_data caps;
+ struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data;
+ struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data;
+ kuid_t rootkuid;
+ struct user_namespace *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
@@ -393,17 +662,18 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry,
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
return -ENODATA;
size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode,
- XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
+ XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
/* no data, that's ok */
return -ENODATA;
+
if (size < 0)
return size;
if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
return -EINVAL;
- cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps.magic_etc);
+ cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) {
case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
@@ -414,8 +684,25 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry,
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (fs_ns != &init_user_ns) {
+ /* unpriv user mounted this fs; make sure they
+ * own current user_ns */
+ rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, 0);
+ if (!rootid_owns_currentns(rootkuid))
+ return -ENODATA;
+ }
tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
break;
+ case VFS_CAP_REVISION_3:
+ if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_3;
+
+ rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, le32_to_cpu(nscaps->rootid));
+ if (!rootid_owns_currentns(rootkuid))
+ return -ENODATA;
+ break;
+
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -423,8 +710,8 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry,
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
if (i >= tocopy)
break;
- cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] =
le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].permitted);
- cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] =
le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable);
+ cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] =
le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
+ cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] =
le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable);
}
cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
@@ -462,8 +749,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool
*effective, bool *has_c
rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc == -EINVAL)
- printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned
%d for %s\n",
- __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps
for %s\n",
+ bprm->filename);
else if (rc == -ENODATA)
rc = 0;
goto out;
@@ -659,15 +946,21 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
- if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
+ /* Ignore non-security xattrs */
+ if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+ sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
+ /* Write from initial user_ns will in * __vfs_setxattr_noperm()
+ * be diverted to a nscap write. But from initial user_ns we
+ * require CAP_SETFCAP targeted at init_user_ns */
+ if (current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns && !capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
- if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
- sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
@@ -685,15 +978,22 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char
*name,
*/
int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
- if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
- if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
+ /* Ignore non-security xattrs */
+ if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+ sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
+ /* security.capability gets namespaced */
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ if (!inode)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
- if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
- sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
@@ -1081,6 +1381,7 @@ struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
--
2.7.4
