Indan Zupancic wrote:
Protecting a TripleDES key in high security standards is not as simple as 
making the kernel
read protected, you need a whole lot and that also means hardware 
(cryptomemories e.t.c)
So you forget about all this overhead when you use assymetric

You need to protect your kernel binary already, adding a key to that doesn't 
increase the
complexity or safety requirements, so all that hardware safety is already in 
place.
(And I'd use AES instead of TripleDES.)

Well, lets assume you have a trapped casing that prevents a flash chip (which holds the kernel) from being tamperred. Then you have write protection of the bzimage

When this thing will run, and it will need to check an executable using AES for example (which is a lot better than TripleDes, i agree) then the key will be for a time window
onto buses and memory. Then it can be probed and retrieved by someone.

Then you need cryptomemory

While with asymmetric you don't. There are no high-risk data anywhere, only a public
key

Of course if you have other data that need to be secured, and you already run on a trusted platform, including all these crypto hardware modules, then you can use
a symmetric scheme

Tasos Parisinos
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