Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> Allow bind mounts to unprivileged users if the following conditions
> are met:
>
> - mountpoint is not a symlink or special file
Why? This sounds like a left over from when we were checking permissions.
> - parent mount is owned by the user
> - the number of user mounts is below the maximum
>
> Unprivileged mounts imply MS_SETUSER, and will also have the "nosuid"
> and "nodev" mount flags set.
So in principle I agree, but in detail I disagree.
capable(CAP_SETUID) should be required to leave MNT_NOSUID clear.
capable(CAP_MKNOD) should be required to leave MNT_NODEV clear.
I.e. We should not special case this as a user mount but rather
simply check to see if the user performing the mount has the appropriate
capabilities to allow the flags.
How we properly propagate MNT_NOSUID and MNT_NODEV in the context of a
user id namespace is still a puzzle to me. Because to the user capability
should theoretically at least be namespace local. However until we
get to the user id namespace we don't have that problem.
Eric
> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> ---
>
> Index: linux/fs/namespace.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/fs/namespace.c 2007-04-20 11:55:09.000000000 +0200
> +++ linux/fs/namespace.c 2007-04-20 11:55:10.000000000 +0200
> @@ -237,11 +237,30 @@ static void dec_nr_user_mounts(void)
> spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
> }
>
> -static void set_mnt_user(struct vfsmount *mnt)
> +static int reserve_user_mount(void)
> +{
> + int err = 0;
> + spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
> + if (nr_user_mounts >= max_user_mounts && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + err = -EPERM;
> + else
> + nr_user_mounts++;
> + spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +static void __set_mnt_user(struct vfsmount *mnt)
> {
> BUG_ON(mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_USER);
> mnt->mnt_uid = current->uid;
> mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_USER;
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NOSUID | MNT_NODEV;
> +}
> +
> +static void set_mnt_user(struct vfsmount *mnt)
> +{
> + __set_mnt_user(mnt);
> spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
> nr_user_mounts++;
> spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
> @@ -260,9 +279,16 @@ static struct vfsmount *clone_mnt(struct
> int flag)
> {
> struct super_block *sb = old->mnt_sb;
> - struct vfsmount *mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(old->mnt_devname);
> + struct vfsmount *mnt;
> +
> + if (flag & CL_SETUSER) {
> + int err = reserve_user_mount();
> + if (err)
> + return ERR_PTR(err);
> + }
> + mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(old->mnt_devname);
> if (!mnt)
> - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> + goto alloc_failed;
>
> mnt->mnt_flags = old->mnt_flags;
> atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
> @@ -274,7 +300,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *clone_mnt(struct
> /* don't copy the MNT_USER flag */
> mnt->mnt_flags &= ~MNT_USER;
> if (flag & CL_SETUSER)
> - set_mnt_user(mnt);
> + __set_mnt_user(mnt);
>
> if (flag & CL_SLAVE) {
> list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &old->mnt_slave_list);
> @@ -299,6 +325,11 @@ static struct vfsmount *clone_mnt(struct
> spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
> }
> return mnt;
> +
> + alloc_failed:
> + if (flag & CL_SETUSER)
> + dec_nr_user_mounts();
> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> }
>
> static inline void __mntput(struct vfsmount *mnt)
> @@ -745,22 +776,29 @@ asmlinkage long sys_oldumount(char __use
>
> #endif
>
> -static int mount_is_safe(struct nameidata *nd)
> +/*
> + * Conditions for unprivileged mounts are:
> + * - mountpoint is not a symlink or special file
> + * - mountpoint is in a mount owned by the user
> + */
> +static bool permit_mount(struct nameidata *nd, int *flags)
> {
> + struct inode *inode = nd->dentry->d_inode;
> +
> if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> - return 0;
> - return -EPERM;
> -#ifdef notyet
> - if (S_ISLNK(nd->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
> - return -EPERM;
> - if (nd->dentry->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) {
> - if (current->uid != nd->dentry->d_inode->i_uid)
> - return -EPERM;
> - }
> - if (vfs_permission(nd, MAY_WRITE))
> - return -EPERM;
> - return 0;
> -#endif
> + return true;
> +
> + if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
> + return false;
> +
> + if (!(nd->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_USER))
> + return false;
> +
> + if (nd->mnt->mnt_uid != current->uid)
> + return false;
> +
> + *flags |= MS_SETUSER;
> + return true;
> }
Can't this just be:
static bool permit_mount(struct nameidata *nd, uid_t *mnt_uid)
{
*mnt_uid = current->fsuid;
if ((nd->mnt->mnt_uid != current->fsuid) && !capable(CAP_SETUID))
return false;
return true;
}
>
> static int lives_below_in_same_fs(struct dentry *d, struct dentry *dentry)
> @@ -981,9 +1019,10 @@ static int do_loopback(struct nameidata
> int clone_flags;
> struct nameidata old_nd;
> struct vfsmount *mnt = NULL;
> - int err = mount_is_safe(nd);
> - if (err)
> - return err;
> + int err;
> +
> + if (!permit_mount(nd, &flags))
> + return -EPERM;
> if (!old_name || !*old_name)
> return -EINVAL;
> err = path_lookup(old_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_nd);
>
> --
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
