Commit-ID:  ce0fa3e56ad20f04d8252353dcd24e924abdafca
Gitweb:     http://git.kernel.org/tip/ce0fa3e56ad20f04d8252353dcd24e924abdafca
Author:     Tony Luck <tony.l...@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 10:18:03 -0700
Committer:  Ingo Molnar <mi...@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 10:30:49 +0200

x86/mm, mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages

Speculative processor accesses may reference any memory that has a
valid page table entry.  While a speculative access won't generate
a machine check, it will log the error in a machine check bank. That
could cause escalation of a subsequent error since the overflow bit
will be then set in the machine check bank status register.

Code has to be double-plus-tricky to avoid mentioning the 1:1 virtual
address of the page we want to map out otherwise we may trigger the
very problem we are trying to avoid.  We use a non-canonical address
that passes through the usual Linux table walking code to get to the
same "pte".

Thanks to Dave Hansen for reviewing several iterations of this.

Also see:

  http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=149860136413338&w=2

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.l...@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <a...@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <b...@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <b...@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brge...@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.han...@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlas...@redhat.com>
Cc: Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory) <elli...@hpe.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <h...@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoim...@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torva...@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horigu...@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <pet...@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux...@kvack.org
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170816171803.28342-1-tony.l...@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mi...@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h   |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/mm_inline.h        |  6 ++++++
 mm/memory-failure.c              |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
index b4a0d43..b50df06 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ static inline void clear_page(void *page)
 
 void copy_page(void *to, void *from);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+#define arch_unmap_kpfn arch_unmap_kpfn
+#endif
+
 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
index 6dde049..3b413065 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include <asm/mce.h>
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/reboot.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
 
 #include "mce-internal.h"
 
@@ -1051,6 +1052,48 @@ static int do_memory_failure(struct mce *m)
        return ret;
 }
 
+#if defined(arch_unmap_kpfn) && defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE)
+
+void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+       unsigned long decoy_addr;
+
+       /*
+        * Unmap this page from the kernel 1:1 mappings to make sure
+        * we don't log more errors because of speculative access to
+        * the page.
+        * We would like to just call:
+        *      set_memory_np((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
+        * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
+        * speculative access to the posion page because we'd have
+        * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
+        * around in registers.
+        * Instead we get tricky.  We create a non-canonical address
+        * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped.
+        * This relies on set_memory_np() not checking whether we passed
+        * a legal address.
+        */
+
+/*
+ * Build time check to see if we have a spare virtual bit. Don't want
+ * to leave this until run time because most developers don't have a
+ * system that can exercise this code path. This will only become a
+ * problem if/when we move beyond 5-level page tables.
+ *
+ * Hard code "9" here because cpp doesn't grok ilog2(PTRS_PER_PGD)
+ */
+#if PGDIR_SHIFT + 9 < 63
+       decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63));
+#else
+#error "no unused virtual bit available"
+#endif
+
+       if (set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1))
+               pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
+
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * The actual machine check handler. This only handles real
  * exceptions when something got corrupted coming in through int 18.
diff --git a/include/linux/mm_inline.h b/include/linux/mm_inline.h
index e030a68..25438b2 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm_inline.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm_inline.h
@@ -126,4 +126,10 @@ static __always_inline enum lru_list page_lru(struct page 
*page)
 
 #define lru_to_page(head) (list_entry((head)->prev, struct page, lru))
 
+#ifdef arch_unmap_kpfn
+extern void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn);
+#else
+static __always_inline void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) { }
+#endif
+
 #endif
diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
index 1cd3b35..8836662 100644
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c
+++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -1146,6 +1146,8 @@ int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int trapno, int 
flags)
                return 0;
        }
 
+       arch_unmap_kpfn(pfn);
+
        orig_head = hpage = compound_head(p);
        num_poisoned_pages_inc();
 

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