From: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
Many x86 CPUs leak information to user space due to missing isolation of
user space and kernel space page tables. There are many well documented
ways to exploit that.
The upcoming software migitation of isolating the user and kernel space
page tables needs a misfeature flag so code can be made runtime
conditional.
Add two BUG bits: One which indicates that the CPU is affected and one that
the software migitation is enabled.
Assume for now that _ALL_ x86 CPUs are affected by this. Exceptions can be
made later.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mi...@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrov...@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <b...@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brge...@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.han...@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <david.lai...@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlas...@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <edu...@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <h...@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoim...@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgr...@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torva...@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <pet...@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.dea...@arm.com>
Cc: aligu...@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gr...@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hu...@google.com
Cc: keesc...@google.com
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -340,5 +340,7 @@
#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep
on GS */
#define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to
wake up remote CPU */
#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the
affected by Erratum 400 */
+#define X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is insecure and
needs kernel page table isolation */
+#define X86_BUG_CPU_SECURE_MODE_PTI X86_BUG(15) /* Kernel Page Table
Isolation enabled*/
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1016,6 +1016,10 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
}
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
+
+ /* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
+
fpu__init_system(c);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
