* David Woodhouse <d...@amazon.co.uk> wrote:
> From: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
>
> Expose indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() for use in subsequent patches.
>
> [karahmed: remove the special-casing of skylake for using IBPB (wtf?),
> switch to using ALTERNATIVES instead of static_cpu_has]
> [dwmw2: set up ax/cx/dx in the asm too so it gets NOP'd out]
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
> Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karah...@amazon.de>
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <d...@amazon.co.uk>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++++++
> 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index 8c9e5c0..cf28399 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -207,6 +207,7 @@
> #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation
> for Spectre variant 2 */
> #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor
> Inventory Number */
>
> +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+16) /* Using Indirect Branch
> Prediction Barrier */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD ( 7*32+17) /* Prediction Command MSR
> (AMD) */
> #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth
> Allocation */
> #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on
> context switches */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> index 4ad4108..c333c95 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> @@ -218,5 +218,21 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
> #endif
> }
>
> +static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long ax, cx, dx;
> +
> + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("",
> + "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t"
> + "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"
> + "movl $0, %%edx\n\t"
> + "wrmsr",
> + X86_FEATURE_IBPB)
> + : "=a" (ax), "=c" (cx), "=d" (dx)
> + : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD),
> + [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB)
> + : "memory");
> +}
> +
> #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> #endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index 390b3dc..96548ff 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -249,6 +249,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
> pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
> }
> +
> + /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
> + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD)) {
> + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
> + pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
> + }
> }
I'd suggest writing out the common 'IBPB' acronym in the messages as well:
pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)\n");
Also, the kernel's barrier*() namespace as it exists today is:
barrier()
barrier_data()
I think the better name to introduce would be:
barrier_indirect_branch_prediction()
to maintain barrier_ as a prefix.
Thanks,
Ingo
