Hi, 2007/5/24, James Morris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
I can restate my question and ask why you'd want a security policy like:Subject 'sysadmin' has: read access to /etc/shadow read/write access to /views/sysadmin/etc/shadow where the objects referenced by the paths are identical and visible to the subject along both paths, in keeping with your description of "policy may allow access to some locations but not to others" ?
If I understand correctly, the original issue was whether to allow passing vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook or not. Which is independent from AA or "pathname based MAC", I think. It is proven that Linux can be used without that change, however it is also clear that current LSM cause the ambiguities as AA people has explained. Clearing ambiguities is a obvious gain to Linux and will make benefits for auditing besides "pathname based MAC". So here's my opinion. If anybody can't explain clear reason (or needs) to keep these ambiguities unsolved, we should consider to merge the proposal. Thanks. -- Toshiharu Harada [EMAIL PROTECTED] - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
