The original kexec_load syscall can not verify file signatures.  This
patch differentiates between the kexec_load and kexec_file_load
syscalls.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>

Changelog v3:
- use switch/case
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 354bb5716ce3..78c15264b17b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES   0x08
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE  0x10
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY    0x20
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC     0x40
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
 int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c 
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index eeb7075868db..fbbcc02a1380 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -432,15 +432,27 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
  */
 int ima_read_data(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
-       bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
+       bool sig_enforce;
 
-       if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) {
-               if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
-                   (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+       if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
+               return 0;
+
+       switch (read_id) {
+       case READING_MODULE:
+               sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); /* appended sig */
+               if (!file && !sig_enforce &&
+                   (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) {
                        pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file 
descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
                        return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
                }
-               return 0;       /* We rely on module signature checking */
+               break;
+       case READING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
+               if (!file && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC)) {
+                       pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a 
file descriptor; try using kexec_file syscall.\n");
+                       return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+               }
+       default:
+               break;
        }
        return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c 
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 8bbc18eb07eb..c27f6993b07a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -448,6 +448,8 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
                return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
        else if (func == POLICY_CHECK)
                return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
+       else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+               return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC;
        return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.7.5

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