On 10/26/2018 10:00 AM, Waiman Long wrote:
> On 10/17/2018 01:59 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
>> With enhanced IBRS in use, the application running on sibling CPU will not
>> be able to launch Spectre v2 attack to the application on current CPU.
>> There is no need to use STIBP for this case. Disable the STIBP code
>> when enhanced IBRS is used.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.c...@linux.intel.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++++++++-
>> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> index 2fc7b4e..6ed82ea 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> @@ -327,6 +327,14 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init
>> spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
>>
>> static bool stibp_needed(void)
>> {
>> + /*
>> + * Determine if we want to leave STIBP always on.
>> + * Using enhanced IBRS makes using STIBP unnecessary.
>> + */
>> +
>> + if (static_branch_unlikely(&spectre_v2_enhanced_ibrs))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE)
>> return false;
>>
>> @@ -881,7 +889,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev,
>> struct device_attribute *attr
>> ", IBPB" : "",
>> boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ?
>> ", IBRS_FW" : "",
>> - (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ?
>> + spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED ?
>> + ", Enhanced IBRS" :
>> + (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ?
>> ", STIBP" : "",
>> boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ?
>> ", RSB filling" : "",
>
> The "Enhanced IBRS" is one of the states of spectre_v2_enabled. So you
> don't need to print that out one more time.
>
This is for the query to to
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
Currently Enhanced IBRS usage is not shown and should be listed.
Tim
