On Sa, 10. Nov 15:17, Nadav Amit wrote:
> text_poke() can potentially compromise the security as it sets temporary
> PTEs in the fixmap. These PTEs might be used to rewrite the kernel code
> from other cores accidentally or maliciously, if an attacker gains the
> ability to write onto kernel memory.
> 
> Moreover, since remote TLBs are not flushed after the temporary PTEs are
> removed, the time-window in which the code is writable is not limited if
> the fixmap PTEs - maliciously or accidentally - are cached in the TLB.
> To address these potential security hazards, we use a temporary mm for
> patching the code.
> 
> Finally, text_poke() is also not conservative enough when mapping pages,
> as it always tries to map 2 pages, even when a single one is sufficient.
> So try to be more conservative, and do not map more than needed.
> 
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <pet...@infradead.org>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.han...@intel.com>
> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhira...@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <na...@vmware.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h |   2 -
>  arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>  2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
> index 50ba74a34a37..9da8cccdf3fb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
> @@ -103,8 +103,6 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
>       FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP,
>  #endif

Hello Nadav,

with the remove of FIX_TEXT_POKE1 and FIX_TEXT_POKE0 i get the following
build error:

/home/damian/kernel/linux/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c:2321:7: Fehler: 
»FIX_TEXT_POKE0« nicht deklariert (erstmalige Verwendung in dieser Funktion); 
meinten Sie »FIX_TBOOT_BASE«?
  case FIX_TEXT_POKE0:
       ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
       FIX_TBOOT_BASE
/home/damian/kernel/linux/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c:2321:7: Anmerkung: jeder nicht 
deklarierte Bezeichner wird nur einmal für jede Funktion, in der er vorkommt, 
gemeldet
/home/damian/kernel/linux/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c:2322:7: Fehler: 
»FIX_TEXT_POKE1« nicht deklariert (erstmalige Verwendung in dieser Funktion); 
meinten Sie »FIX_TBOOT_BASE«?
  case FIX_TEXT_POKE1:
       ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
       FIX_TBOOT_BASE

Best regards
Damian

> -     FIX_TEXT_POKE1, /* reserve 2 pages for text_poke() */
> -     FIX_TEXT_POKE0, /* first page is last, because allocation is backward */
>  #ifdef       CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MID
>       FIX_LNW_VRTC,
>  #endif
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> index d3ae5c26e5a0..96607ef285c3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>  #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>  #include <linux/kdebug.h>
> +#include <linux/mmu_context.h>
>  #include <asm/text-patching.h>
>  #include <asm/alternative.h>
>  #include <asm/sections.h>
> @@ -683,43 +684,108 @@ __ro_after_init unsigned long poking_addr;
>  
>  static int __text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len)
>  {
> +     bool cross_page_boundary = offset_in_page(addr) + len > PAGE_SIZE;
> +     temporary_mm_state_t prev;
> +     struct page *pages[2] = {NULL};
>       unsigned long flags;
> -     char *vaddr;
> -     struct page *pages[2];
> -     int i, r = 0;
> +     pte_t pte, *ptep;
> +     spinlock_t *ptl;
> +     int r = 0;
>  
>       /*
> -      * While boot memory allocator is runnig we cannot use struct
> -      * pages as they are not yet initialized.
> +      * While boot memory allocator is running we cannot use struct pages as
> +      * they are not yet initialized.
>        */
>       BUG_ON(!after_bootmem);
>  
>       if (!core_kernel_text((unsigned long)addr)) {
>               pages[0] = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
> -             pages[1] = vmalloc_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE);
> +             if (cross_page_boundary)
> +                     pages[1] = vmalloc_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE);
>       } else {
>               pages[0] = virt_to_page(addr);
>               WARN_ON(!PageReserved(pages[0]));
> -             pages[1] = virt_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE);
> +             if (cross_page_boundary)
> +                     pages[1] = virt_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE);
>       }
> -     if (!pages[0])
> +
> +     if (!pages[0] || (cross_page_boundary && !pages[1]))
>               return -EFAULT;
> +
>       local_irq_save(flags);
> -     set_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE0, page_to_phys(pages[0]));
> -     if (pages[1])
> -             set_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE1, page_to_phys(pages[1]));
> -     vaddr = (char *)fix_to_virt(FIX_TEXT_POKE0);
> -     memcpy(&vaddr[(unsigned long)addr & ~PAGE_MASK], opcode, len);
> -     clear_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE0);
> -     if (pages[1])
> -             clear_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE1);
> -     local_flush_tlb();
> -     sync_core();
> -     /* Could also do a CLFLUSH here to speed up CPU recovery; but
> -        that causes hangs on some VIA CPUs. */
> -     for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
> -             if (((char *)addr)[i] != ((char *)opcode)[i])
> -                     r = -EFAULT;
> +
> +     /*
> +      * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid open-coding.
> +      */
> +     ptep = get_locked_pte(poking_mm, poking_addr, &ptl);
> +
> +     /*
> +      * If we failed to allocate a PTE, fail. This should *never* happen,
> +      * since we preallocate the PTE.
> +      */
> +     if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ptep))
> +             goto out;
> +
> +     pte = mk_pte(pages[0], PAGE_KERNEL);
> +     set_pte_at(poking_mm, poking_addr, ptep, pte);
> +
> +     if (cross_page_boundary) {
> +             pte = mk_pte(pages[1], PAGE_KERNEL);
> +             set_pte_at(poking_mm, poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE, ptep + 1, pte);
> +     }
> +
> +     /*
> +      * Loading the temporary mm behaves as a compiler barrier, which
> +      * guarantees that the PTE will be set at the time memcpy() is done.
> +      */
> +     prev = use_temporary_mm(poking_mm);
> +
> +     kasan_disable_current();
> +     memcpy((u8 *)poking_addr + offset_in_page(addr), opcode, len);
> +     kasan_enable_current();
> +
> +     /*
> +      * Ensure that the PTE is only cleared after the instructions of memcpy
> +      * were issued by using a compiler barrier.
> +      */
> +     barrier();
> +
> +     pte_clear(poking_mm, poking_addr, ptep);
> +
> +     /*
> +      * __flush_tlb_one_user() performs a redundant TLB flush when PTI is on,
> +      * as it also flushes the corresponding "user" address spaces, which
> +      * does not exist.
> +      *
> +      * Poking, however, is already very inefficient since it does not try to
> +      * batch updates, so we ignore this problem for the time being.
> +      *
> +      * Since the PTEs do not exist in other kernel address-spaces, we do
> +      * not use __flush_tlb_one_kernel(), which when PTI is on would cause
> +      * more unwarranted TLB flushes.
> +      *
> +      * There is a slight anomaly here: the PTE is a supervisor-only and
> +      * (potentially) global and we use __flush_tlb_one_user() but this
> +      * should be fine.
> +      */
> +     __flush_tlb_one_user(poking_addr);
> +     if (cross_page_boundary) {
> +             pte_clear(poking_mm, poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE, ptep + 1);
> +             __flush_tlb_one_user(poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE);
> +     }
> +
> +     /*
> +      * Loading the previous page-table hierarchy requires a serializing
> +      * instruction that already allows the core to see the updated version.
> +      * Xen-PV is assumed to serialize execution in a similar manner.
> +      */
> +     unuse_temporary_mm(prev);
> +
> +     pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
> +out:
> +     if (memcmp(addr, opcode, len))
> +             r = -EFAULT;
> +
>       local_irq_restore(flags);
>       return r;
>  }
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 

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