Currently, when checking to see if accessing n bytes starting at
address "ptr" will cause a wraparound in the memory addresses,
the check in check_bogus_address() adds an extra byte, which is
incorrect, as the range of addresses that will be accessed is
[ptr, ptr + (n - 1)].
This can lead to incorrectly detecting a wraparound in the
memory address, when trying to read 4 KB from memory that is
mapped to the the last possible page in the virtual address
space, when in fact, accessing that range of memory would not
cause a wraparound to occur.
Use the memory range that will actually be accessed when
considering if accessing a certain amount of bytes will cause
the memory address to wrap around.
Change-Id: I2563a5988e41122727ede17180f365e999b953e6
Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Co-Developed-by: Prasad Sodagudi <psoda...@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Prasad Sodagudi <psoda...@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres <isa...@codeaurora.org>
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
---
mm/usercopy.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index 852eb4e..0293645 100644
--- a/mm/usercopy.c
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static inline void check_bogus_address(const unsigned long
ptr, unsigned long n,
bool to_user)
{
/* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */
- if (ptr + n < ptr)
+ if (ptr + (n - 1) < ptr)
usercopy_abort("wrapped address", NULL, to_user, 0, ptr + n);
/* Reject if NULL or ZERO-allocation. */
--
The Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of the Code Aurora Forum,
a Linux Foundation Collaborative Project
