> On Nov 14, 2018, at 4:09 AM, David Laight <david.lai...@aculab.com> wrote:
>
> From: William Kucharski
>> Sent: 14 November 2018 10:35
>>
>>> On Nov 13, 2018, at 5:51 PM, Isaac J. Manjarres <isa...@codeaurora.org>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
>>> index 852eb4e..0293645 100644
>>> --- a/mm/usercopy.c
>>> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
>>> @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static inline void check_bogus_address(const unsigned
>>> long ptr, unsigned long n,
>>> bool to_user)
>>> {
>>> /* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */
>>> - if (ptr + n < ptr)
>>> + if (ptr + (n - 1) < ptr)
>>> usercopy_abort("wrapped address", NULL, to_user, 0, ptr + n);
>>
>> I'm being paranoid, but is it possible this routine could ever be passed "n"
>> set to zero?
>>
>> If so, it will erroneously abort indicating a wrapped address as (n - 1)
>> wraps to ULONG_MAX.
>>
>> Easily fixed via:
>>
>> if ((n != 0) && (ptr + (n - 1) < ptr))
>
> Ugg... you don't want a double test.
>
> I'd guess that a length of zero is likely, but a usercopy that includes
> the highest address is going to be invalid because it is a kernel address
> (on most archs, and probably illegal on others).
> What you really want to do is add 'ptr + len' and check the carry flag.
The extra test is only a few extra instructions, but I understand the concern.
(Though I don't
know how you'd access the carry flag from C in a machine-independent way. Also,
for the
calculation to be correct you still need to check 'ptr + (len - 1)' for the
wrap.)
You could also theoretically call gcc's __builtin_uadd_overflow() if you want
to get carried away.
As I mentioned, I was just being paranoid, but the passed zero length issue
stood out to me.
William Kucharski
